INTELIGÊNCIA

Studies in Intelligence
Journal of the American Intelligence Professional
Unclassified extracts from Studies in Intelligence Volume 52, Number 1
(March 2008)
Center for the Study of Intelligence
West -Arbeit (Western Operations)
Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89
Turning a Cold War Scheme into Reality
Engineering the Berlin Tunnel
The Movie Breach: A Personal Perspective
Brian J. Kelley
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
On the Web at cia.gov
Five Months in Petrograd 1918:
Robert W. Imbrie and the US Search
for Information in Russia
David A. Langbart
This publication is prepared primarily for the use of US government
officials. The format, coverage, and content are designed to
meet their requirements. To that end, complete issues of Studies
in Intelligence may remain classified and are not circulated to the
public. These printed unclassified extracts from a classified issue
are provided as a courtesy to subscribers.
Studies in Intelligence is available on the Internet at: https://
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
index.html. Some of the material in this publication is copyrighted,
and noted as such. Those items should not be reproduced
or disseminated without permission.
Requests for subscriptions should be sent to:
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
ISSN 1527-0874
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any historical, operational,
doctrinal, or theoretical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting
or rejecting an article rests with the
Editorial Board.
The criterion for publication is
whether, in the opinion of the Board,
the article makes a contribution to the
literature of intelligence.
EDITORIAL BOARD
Carmen A. Medina, Chairperson
Frans Bax
A. Denis Clift
Nicholas Dujmovic
Eric N. Heller
Robert A. Kandra
William C. Liles
Jason U. Manosevitz
William Nolte
Maj. Gen. Richard J. O’Lear,
USAF (Ret.)
Dwight Pinkley
Michael P. Richter
Barry G. Royden
Noah D. Rozman
Jon A. Wiant
Ursula Wilder
Members of the Board are drawn from the
Central Intelligence Agency and other
Intelligence Community components.
EDITORIAL STAFF
Andres Vaart, Editor
Carey Dueweke, Graphics/Web
C O N T E N T S
Studies in Intelligence Vol 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) i
CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
Washington, DC 20505
Contributors iii
Studies in Intelligence Awards, 2007 v
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
West -Arbeit (Western Operations)
Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89 1
Beatrice de Graaf
Turning a Cold War Scheme into Reality
Engineering the Berlin Tunnel 17
G . . .
On the Web at cia.gov1
Five Months in Petrograd 1918:
Robert W. Imbrie and the US Search
for Information in Russia Web only
David A. Langbart
INTELLIGENCE IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA
The Movie Breach: A Personal Perspective 25
Brian J. Kelley
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 31
Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
1 https://cia..gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html

Contributors
Studies in Intelligence Vol 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) iii
Beatrice de Graaf (PhD) studied modern history and German literature and culture at Utrecht
University and in Bonn, Germany. She was an assistant professor at Utrecht’s History Institute
before becoming assistant professor and researcher at Leiden University’s Center for Terrorism
and Counterterrorism at The Hague Campus.
G served in the Directorate of Operations.
Brian J. Kelley served as a case officer for both the US Air Force and CIA, specializing in
counterintelligence for more than 40 years before his retirement in 2007. He currently teaches
officers in CIA and the Department of Defense about the art of counterintelligence.
David A. Langbart is an archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration. He is
responsible for the appraisal of records of the Department of State and agencies of the Intelligence
Community, including CIA.
Hayden Peake is the curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served in the Directorate
of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) v
Studies in Intelligence
Awards, 2007
Studies in Intelligence 2007 Annual Awards were presented to authors in
December 2007 by the Associate Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency Michael Morell. The following were honored for unclassified
articles:
Dr. Mark E. Benbow was recognized for “‘All the Brains I Can Borrow:’
Woodrow Wilson and Intelligence Gathering in Mexico: 1913–1915,” Volume
51, Number 4. Mr. Benbow worked as an analyst in the Directorate
of Intelligence and then as a support officer in CIA for 15 years before
becoming the staff historian at the Woodrow Wilson House Museum in
Washington DC. He now teaches history at Marymount University in
Virginia.
Mr. Ricky Dale Calhoun received the Walter Pforzheimer award for his
essay “Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis of 1956,” in Volume 51,
Number 2. The Pforzheimer award is reserved for the year’s outstanding
essay by a student. Mr. Calhoun is a PhD candidate at Kansas State University,
where he is studying history and international security.
Andrew Finlayson received an award for “The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance
Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70” in Volume
51, Number 2. Colonel Finlayson, USMC (Ret.) served a two tours in Vietnam
during the Vietnam War. During one of those tours, he served in the
Agency’s Phoenix Program.
David Robarge was recognized for the outstanding book review published
in 2007—”A Review of Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying Volume
51, Number 1. Dr. Robarge is the CIA’s chief historian, and he has won
several Studies in Intelligence awards for his contributions.
❖ ❖ ❖

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 1
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government
endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
West -Arbeit (Western Operations)
Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89
Beatrice de Graaf
In the year 2000, the case of
former Chancellor Helmut
Kohl, who had sued the German
Office of the Commissioner
for the Records of the
State Security Service of the
German Democratic Republic
(BStU) for releasing files concerning
his political activities
before 1989, invoked new interest
in a special category of victims
and collaborators of the
Stasi, East Germany’s Ministry
for State Security (Ministerium
für Staatssicherheit—
MfS). This category involved
West Germans and other West
Europeans who were the subject
of the Stasi’s West-Arbeit
(Western operations).a1
Several studies of the West-
Arbeit have been published.
Some historians, for example,
Hubertus Knabe, mentioned
the possibility that 20,000 West
Germans may have been spies.
Official BStU estimates are
much lower, perhaps 3,500–
6,000 over a period of 40 years.
In 1989, 1,500 of them were
still operational. These agents
spied on thousands of West
German companies, organizations,
and citizens, including
Helmut Kohl. They also worked
against East Germans who
were in contact with the West.b2
For the Stasi, West-Arbeit
activities im und nach dem
Operationsgebiet (in and
directed to the target region)
were organized not only in geographic
terms but in political,
organizational, and structural
terms. With the scope of West-
Arbeit so broadly defined, the
boundaries between foreign
intelligence and domestic policing
could not be discerned
clearly in Stasi activites.
Although most of the records
of the Stasi’s Main Directorate
for Intelligence (the Hauptverwaltung
Aufklärung—HVA)
a The BStU (Die Beaufträgte für die Unterlagen
des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der
ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik) is responsible for preserving the
records of the Stasi, which had responsibility
for both external and internal security.
The files on Kohl suggested he had taken
bribes from major firms on behalf of his
party, the Christian Democratic Union.
The BStU’s functions are described on its
Web site, www.bstu.bund.de.
b Knabe’s 1999 study was reviewed by CIA
historian Ben Fischer in Studies in Intelligence
46, no. 2 (2002). It offers a useful
overview in English of East German intelligence.
“ With the scope of West-
Arbeit so broadly
defined, the boundaries
between foreign
intelligence and
domestic policing could
not be discerned clearly
”
in Stasi activites.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Hatred of the enemy was the Stasi’s all encompassing idea.
have been destroyed, traces of
the West-Arbeit can be found in
“domestic” departments of the
MfS. Research into this branch
of activities is all the more
revealing because the files of
the West German intelligence
and security services remain
closed.
The West-Arbeit had a direct
relationship to the domestic
duties of the Stasi, because the
enemy against whom the operations
were directed could be
located abroad, among foreigners,
or within the GDR population
itself. As can be deduced
from the training manual of the
Stasi, Haß auf den Feind
(hatred of the enemy) was the
organization’s all encompassing
idea.
Established as the counterpart
and junior partner of the
KGB and staffed with communist
veterans like Erich Mielke,
Ernst Wollweber, and Wilhelm
Zaisser, the Stasi was a repressive
institution from its beginnings.
Because communism was
considered the logical and inevitable
outcome of history, shortcomings
and conflicts within
the system could only be caused
by external factors, for example,
saboteurs inspired by the
great class enemy in the West.
This definition of the enemy
evolved over time, but it was
still in place during the neue
Ostpolitik of 1970–72 of West-
German Chancellor Willy
Brandt (1969–74). Brandt’s outreach
brought the GDR considerable
gains: diplomatic
recognition (and thus embassies)
in the West, economic
treaties, technological imports
(microelectronics, computers),
and loans.
The gains also brought new
dangers: East Germany’s policy
of Abgrenzung (the ideological,
political and geographical
sealing off of the GDR from the
West, in particular from the
FRG) began to erode because of
the many contacts with the
West established during this
period. The increased percolation
through the Wall of Western
influences was mirrored by
the growth of the Stasi. The
“shield and sword of the party”
had to make up for the new
openness with a major expansion
of its personnel, informal
agents (inoffizielle mitarbeiter),
and duties. At the same time,
the Stasi made good use of contacts
fostered by Brandt’s Ostpolitik
and began new
offensives against the West.
These were directed mainly
against West Germany, but
other West European countries,
including the Netherlands,
also were targetted.
The Stasi’s Image of the
Enemy, as seen through the
Netherlands
Eva Horn (professor of German
literature and the theory
of espionage) has written that
“enemy images” are the backbone
of intelligence services,
but that these images can have
negative effects on their
efficiency.3 With respect to
Stasi operations against the
Dutch, I will argue that the
image of the enemy, conceived
through a Marxist-Leninist perspective,
drove Stasi actions
with apparent success at a tactical
level. Strategically, however,
the Stasi actions failed to
prevent the fall of the regime it
was charged with protecting.
In this article, I will investigate
what the MfS was after in
and against the Netherlands and
to what extent these operations
were affected by its thinking
about the enemy. Information
about these operations is available
in the archives of the Stasi’s
HVA (foreign intelligence and
counterespionage) as well as its
Directorate XX (internal opposition)
(Hauptabteilung XX—HA
XX), and HA I (military intelligence),
which are maintained by
the BStU.
Intelligence Requirements
Regarding the Netherlands
According to MfS guideline
No. 1/79, the Stasi was to concentrate
on the following goals:
•neutralizing and combating
“political-ideological diversion”;
• gathering military intelligence;
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 3
•gathering economic intelligence;
•counterintelligence.4
Under these guidelines, at
least five MfS directorates—
HVA, HA XX, HA I, HA II
(counterespionage), and HA
XVIII (economic intelligence
and security)—ran operations
against the Netherlands.
Research into BStU holdings
reveals a broad range of topics
and targets between 1979 and
1989.
HVA (foreign intelligence)
files contain intelligence on:
•NATO-deployment preparations,
the AFCENT-headquarters
in Brunssum and the
Dutch position in the INFnegotiations;
•preparations for East German
communist leader Erich
Honecker’s visit to the Netherlands
in June 1987;
•activities of the “hostile-negative
forces”in the Dutch peace
movement;
•reliability of the employees of
the GDR consulate and
embassy in the Netherlands;
•the microelectronics program
of the Philips Corporation;
•the Dutch civil and military
security service (telephone
numbers, organization charts,
pictures);
• security-related issues, such
as activities of right wing
groups, and terrorist
incidents.5
HA I (military intelligence)
collected material on:
•military exercises of the
Dutch armed forces;
•The Rotterdam harbour;
HA II and HA XVIII were
interested in:
•“operational games” by the
Dutch security services
against the GDR embassy,
consulate, and personnel;
• security issues surrounding
the embassy compound.6
HA XX (internal opposition)
files contain most of the more
elaborate analyses found in
these files. These mainly regard
the:
•Dutch peace movement;
• contacts between Dutch and
East German churches, peace
groups, and individuals;
•political positions of the
Dutch government concerning
detente and the East-West
conflict.
Intelligence Assets
East German intelligence in
the Netherlands involved the
use of open sources (OSINT)
and technical and human collection.
OSINT was easy to
come by: The Stasi collected
newspaper clippings, official
(government) publications, and
“grey” reports on GDR- or security-
related issues. The MfS
also made good use of articles
on Dutch military and security
issues published by Dutch leftwing
pacifist organizations and
parties. The Pacifist Political
Party, the PSP, for example,
exposed details of the structure
and activities of the Dutch
security service (the Binnenlandse
Veiligheidsdienst—
BVD). These were immediately
analyzed and sent to Berlin.7
With respect to technical collection,
little is known from the
existing files. There is some evidence
that the MfS made use of
Dutch radio and telecommunications,
including those of
Dutch military radio and satellite
installations in Westerbork
and Eibergen.8
Humint was the Stasi’s main
source for West-Arbeit in the
Netherlands. Before the Dutch
officially recognized the GDR in
January 1973, the HVA made
use of the handful of salesmen
and church officials who had
established contacts in the
Netherlands. Because of the
proximity of the two countries,
these so-called headquarters
operations were relatively easy
to set up. According to a former
Dutch intelligence officer, most
of the West-Arbeit against the
Humint was the Stasi’s main source for West-Arbeit in the Netherlands.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
On at least three occasions the MfS did run successful operations
over a longer period of time.
Netherlands was conducted
through headquarters operations.
The agents participating in
those operations could be East
Germans, but sometimes they
had Dutch backgrounds.
According to the same Dutch
intelligence officer, most East
German headquarters operations
used Dutch citizens who
eventually were doubled by the
BVD.9 New Stasi files suggest
this is not the case.
From 1973 on, political and
economic relations also provided
up-to-date information.
However, the MfS was especially
interested in non-governmental
relations between
protestant church congregations
and peace groups in both
countries. Around 1978, some
100 parish contacts had been
established, and by 1984 the
number had grown to more
than 150. By then, 9,000 to
12,000 Dutch protestants and
peace activists were participating
in exchange programs.10
Diplomatic recognition also
enabled the MfS to place at
least three “legal” intelligence
officers at its residentura in the
embassy. Although the BVD
kept the GDR embassy under
strict surveillance, the MfS residentura
was able to run several
informal-agent operations
from the embassy.11 The
records reveal that the following
assets were recruited in the
Netherlands (through headquarters
operations or by legal
residents):
•Three informal agents in the
Dutch-East German Friendship
Association (a subdivision
of the official Liga für
Völkerfreundschaft)
•One informal agent and one
“prospective agent” from the
Horizontal Platform, a Marxist-
Leninist offshoot of the
Dutch Communist Party.
•Several “contact persons” (not
quite “informal agents” but
something less committed)
inside the Stop-the-Neutron-
Bomb campaign and other left
wing peace groups.
•At least two informal agents
not affiliated with left wing
organizations, but recruited
because they sought adventure
or had financial needs.
The MfS was not allowed to
recruit members of the official
Dutch Communist Party (they
could only be used as contact
persons, not as informal
agents). Most informal agents
and other sources were nevertheless
drawn into its service
through their sympathy for
communist ideals or through
their “progressive political convictions,”
as Stasi chief Erich
Mielke phrased it. As late in
the Cold War as September
1988, the resident was complaining
about the large number
of Dutch citizens who were
showing up at the embassy to
offer themselves to the
service.12
On the whole, informal agents
like these volunteers were of
limited utility as sources. The
members of the Friendship
Association (the informal
agents “Aorta,” “Arthur,” and
“Ozon,” for example) or members
of other GDR-affiliated
organizations were either too
old, unemployed, or too suspect
to get anywhere near interesting
military or political information.
The resident came to
the same conclusion: Their
assets were too “leftist” and
attempts to “broaden the contact
scope did not produce many
results,” he lamented in 1988.13
Stasi “Success” Stories
However, on at least three
occasions the MfS did run successful
operations over longer
periods of time: on military
intelligence, on the Dutch peace
movement, and against a group
of Dutch draft resisters with
East German contacts.
Military Reconnaissance—
“Abruf”
The MfS was first of all interested
in political and military
intelligence on the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the
main enemy of the Warsaw
Pact. Within pact collection
arrangements, the GDR was
responsible for collecting intelligence
concerning the areas
associated with NATO Army
Group North and Army Group
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 5
The BVD, however, was a formidable adversary for the HVA.
Central. The HVA, with 4,000
members, and the military
intelligence service of the East
German Army, with 2,000
members, were responsible for
carrying out these operations.
West Germany, Great Britain,
France, the Benelux and Denmark
were defined as principal
objectives.
Fulfilling this aim in the
Netherlands meant gathering
early warning about NATO
preparations and securing
information about the order of
battle and military dispositions.
In addition to the targets
listed above, HVA was also
interested in Dutch military
compounds and in the Schiphol
and Zestienhoven airports.14
The BVD, however, proved a
formidable adversary for the
HVA. Intensive Dutch surveillance
turned the residentura in
The Hague into little more than
a shelter for underemployed
case officers. HVA security
reports from 1984 on regularly
record Stasi suspicions that the
BVD was using its connections
in the Dutch media to publicize
acts of espionage conducted by
the socialist states. Ironically,
these complaints (partially justified,
as we shall see) were
triggered by concern in Dutch
conservative circles that Warsaw
Pact countries were trying
to infiltrate and manipulate the
country’s peace movement. Politicians
asked questions in Parliament,
and the Home Office
felt compelled to increase security
measures.
According to the MfS residentura
in The Hague, the BVD
conducted so many unfriendly
acts of surveillance and recruiting
activities against the
embassy, against East German
citizens in the Netherlands, and
against “friendly” organizations,
such as the Friendship
Association GDR-Netherlands
(Vriendschapsvereniging Nederland-
DDR), that they threatened
to “obstruct the positive
effect of the socialist detente
politics concerning disarmament
questions.” That is, the
Stasi blamed the BVD for deteriorating
East-West relations
and troubled disarmament
talks.15
However, at least one Dutch
informal agent of the 1980s,
whose codename was Abruf (“on
call”) was not discovered. Abruf
was run by a case officer codenamed
Hilmar, who was a
member of the legal residentura
of the military intelligence
department of the East German
Army and worked in close
cooperation with the MfS staff
at the East German embassy.
Hilmar had recruited Abruf in
November 1983 at a meeting of
the Communist Party of the
Netherlands (CPN) that he, as
a comrade and embassy official,
could legally attend.
Hilmar described Abruf as
young, unemployed, unhappy
with the perceived rightist policies
of the Dutch government,
frustrated by the NATO-modernization
decision, and a
staunch supporter of communism.
Hilmar played into this
zeal and general disaffection
with the capitalist environment
and had no difficulty
recruiting the young man.16
As his codename implied,
Abruf was used as a freelance
agent. He received instructions
to photograph Rotterdam Harbor,
the Schiphol and Zestienhoven
airports, industrial
plants in the region, and military
compounds. He also collected
material on NATO
Exercise REFORGER in 1985.
After 1985, he was told to move
to Woensdrecht, a site then
being prepared to receive new
NATO missiles.
Abruf received payments of
100 Dutch guilders for every
task he carried out. Contact
with his case officer was made
through dead drops and in
short meetings (after long, frantic
diversions and smoke
screens) in crowded places,
such as the Jungerhans department
store in Rotterdam. To
some of these rendezvous he
brought his girlfriend.17
Abruf’s employment ended
after three years, in 1986, after
an assignment in 1985 raised
suspicions. In that year, he was
ordered to Coevorden, Ter Apel,
and Vriezenveen, where he was
told to locate military depots,
and to Woensdrecht, where he
was to photograph the deployment
site. On 25 February
1986, the BVD paid him a visit
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Interest in the Dutch peace movement and its church grew out of
opposition to the planned modernization and expansion of
NATO’s intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles.
and asked about the trip to
Vriezenveen and about his contacts
with the GDR embassy.
The BVD had stumbled across
Abruf while they were following
Hilmar. At the time, Dutch
security did not seem to know
much about Abruf’s history and
actual activities as an agent.
Hilmar had already been
replaced by an MfS case officer
codenamed Haupt. The BVD
visit alarmed both Abruf and
the residentura, and the relationship
was mutually terminated
two days after the
inquiry.
Informal agent Abruf had provided
the Stasi with useful
reconnaissance material on
Dutch military and economic
capabilities centering around
the Rotterdam region. His cover
was never really blown, and the
BVD did not uncover his real
activities. After 1989, he left
the Netherlands and disappeared.
What Abruf provided was typical
of the many reports on
Dutch military matters, sometimes
via open sources, sometimes
of obscure origin, found in
Stasi files. One of the showpieces
is a detailed description
of the organizational structure—
telephone numbers
included—of the intelligence
department of the Dutch land
forces.18
The Stasi and the Dutch Peace
Movement
Files unearthed in the BStU
archives also provide insight
into another type of intelligence
activity, covert influence
operations. The Stasi focused in
the late 1970s and 1980s on the
Dutch peace movement and
churches and invested heavily
in them and selected leaders.
Ironically, the East Germans
would find their efforts turned
against them as circumstances
in Europe and the Soviet Union
changed with the introduction
of perestroika and other
reforms in the region.
East German interest in the
Dutch peace movement and its
church grew out of West European
and Dutch opposition to
the planned modernization and
expansion of NATO’s intermediate
range ballistic and cruise
missiles in Western Europe in
1977. By the early 1980s, hundreds
of thousands of Dutch
people would demonstrate to
attempt to force the government
to postpone or cancel the
deployments.
The opposition spawned new
opportunities for Soviet and
Warsaw Pact leaders, and the
official communist World Peace
Council and its suborganizations
were used to wage open
and covert campaigns to capitalize
on the protests.19
Between 1977 and 1979, the
ruling East German Socialist
Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands—
SED) and the peace council
were responsible, among other
things, for financial and logistic
support of the “Stop the
Neutron Bomb” campaign—a
Dutch communist front organization
that cost East Berlin
around 120,000 Dutch guilders
(110,000 West German DM).20
In addition, the Stasi influenced
the foundation Generals
for Peace—a well known and
respected anti-nuclear peace
organization of former West
European generals, with Dutch
General Michiel von Meyenfeldt
(former chief of the Dutch
Royal Military Academy) as
secretary. To support its perspectives,
the Stasi gave it
100,000 West German DM
annually.21
Even more potentially useful,
it seemed to the Kremlin and
East Berlin, was the expansion
of the support base of the peace
movement in the Netherlands
to include churches and the
Dutch Interchurch Peace Council
(Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad—
IKV), which had started a
campaign for unilateral atomic
disarmament in the Netherlands.
All influential Dutch
churches participated in the
IKV, and the organization succeeded
in mobilizing large parts
of Dutch society.22 East German
leader Erich Honecker
believed that the Dutch “religious
powers” were the main
cause of turning the antinuclear
campaign into a mass
movement,22 and invitations
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 7
would follow to a variety of
church officials to visit likeminded
groups in East Germany.
However, Stasi sympathy for
the Dutch peace movement
started to turn sour after 1981.
After Polish government
repression of the independent
trade union Solidarity in
Poland and after exchanges
with members of the Czechoslovak
dissident group Charter 77,
the IKV radically altered its
positions and began to target
not only NATO missiles but
those of the Warsaw Pact and
demanded that all member
countries start dismantling
nuclear missiles on their own
territories rather than pointing
fingers at other nations. In
effect, this meant the end of a
purely anti-NATO campaign.23
To make matters worse for
the communists, the IKV
extended its contacts with dissidents
throughout Eastern
Europe and declared that
repression in the East was a
major political cause of the
arms race and not the other
way around. The IKV planned
to organize a peace
movement “from
below” to confront
both superpowers at
grassroot levels.24
With its change of
position, extant
church contacts
within the GDR
became especially
interesting for the
IKV—and troublesome
to the MfS.
Most inviting was
an independent
peace movement
that appeared in
East German protestant
churches in
1978 called Swords
Into Plowshares
(Schwerter zu Pflugscharen).
The IKV
followed up and sent
emissaries to various
peace groups in
the GDR—as tourists,
or under the
umbrella of church exchanges—
and eventually announced the
formation of a joint Peace Platform
with East German dissidents
in the summer of 1982.
The Stasi read about the
development in a Dutch newspaper
and went on red alert.
Honecker himself ordered the
official state Secretariat for
Religious Matters (Staatssekretariat
für Kirchenfragen) to
exert all means of influence to
eliminate these “divisive forces”
(Spalterkräfte).25
A four-part campaign against
the IKV was begun. First, the
Stasi activated its church
agents to force the abandonment
of the platform.26 Second,
it started a smear campaign
against the IKV. IKV Secretary
Mient Jan Faber and other officials
of his group were registered
as persons of criminal
intent.27 Party and state officials,
newspapers and front
organizations were instructed
to depict the IKV as a divisive
force within the West European
peace movement and
Faber as an arrogant bully.28
Third, Faber himself was
barred from entering the
GDR.29 And finally , the existing
contacts between Dutch
reformed parishes and East
German congregations were
threatened. The Dutch working
group within the East German
churches was told that the
obstructions were caused by the
state’s misgivings about the
IKV. Several visits of Dutch
A four-part campaign against the IKV was begun.
A leaflet of the IKV illustrating the cooperation
between it and East German and Hungarian organizations.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
delegations to East Germany
and vice versa were cancelled.30
These measures were
informed by the strategy of “differentiation”
(Differenzierung),
which was a very subtle method
of alienating “divisive” and negative
elements from their own
base.31 The Stasi sorted out
which IKV and church members
disliked Faber and invited
them to East Berlin. It succeeded
in manipulating the
president of the IKV and
reformed church official Jan
van Putten, General von Meyenfeldt—
he was also an advisor
to the Reformed Churches
in the Netherlands and a board
member of the IKV—and lowerranking
IKV members.32 IKV
officials, Dutch church groups
and journalists were led to
believe that the IKV’s secretary
was no longer in favour in
East Europe or with the protestant
churches in the GDR.33
In line with this strategy, the
Stasi also tried to recruit
agents in the Netherlands. IKV
Secretary Janneke Houdijk,
IKV’s coordinator for East Germany,
was approached —in
vain. She did not recognise the
attempts for what they were
and remained loyal to Faber.34
In the end, however, the
efforts bore fruit. East-German
churches detached themselves
from their IKV contacts and
froze most exchange activities.
In the Netherlands, many
Dutch church leaders and local
groups were convinced that
Faber was a threat to stability
and East-West relations.35
Faber was threatened with dismissal.
Local IKV groups and
parishes sent angry letters to
IKV headquarters and
demanded that Faber stop meddling
in internal East German
affairs, let alone lead a campaign
for human rights.36 The
envisaged Peace Platform never
came into being, frustrated in
advance by the Stasi, which
was helped, knowingly or
unknowingly, by Dutch and
East German church leaders.
Ironically, after Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power in the
Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist
enmity towards a democratization
approach faded away. The
new leadership in the Kremlin
even developed sympathy for it,
and, in 1988, Faber and British
peace activist Mary Kaldor
were invited to Moscow to
observe the dismantling of SS-
20 rockets. The same year, an
IKV delegation visited Moscow,
invited by the Kremlin itself.37
The GDR, however, stuck to its
rigid policy. The Stasi was
appalled by the tolerance of
Soviet communists toward
Dutch peace activists and did
not adapt itself to the new liberalism.
Indeed, it continued
the struggle against the IKV
and even started a new action
The Stasi was appalled by the tolerance of Soviet communists toward
Dutch peace activists and did not adapt itself to the new liberalism.
A page from the file of Mient Jan Faber.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 9
against it in 1988. Operations
were only aborted after the Berlin
Wall came down in November
1989.
Operation “Bicycle Tour”
Groups other than the IKV
tried to establish exchange programs
with East German peace
activists, and in doing so generated
a Stasi response that illustrates
the entanglement of
foreign and domestic intelligence
activity in East Germany.
In 1981, a group of draft resisters
from the northern Dutch city
of Groningen founded an organization
called the Peace Shop
(Vredeswinkel). The entity functioned
as a communication centre
for peace activists from the
region. Through existing church
contacts and the War Resisters
International, the leaders soon
contacted a construction branch
of the East German army
known as the Bausoldaten, that
had since 1964 been offering the
possibility of completing obligatory
military service not with
arms but with the spade. This
alternative had been provided at
the urging of East German protestant
churches, which represented
about 45 percent of the
GDR’s population.
As a grass roots organization,
the Peace Shop organized bicycle
tours through East Germany
as a joint venture of
Dutch, East German, and,
when possible, Czechoslovak
and Polish conscientious objectors.
The Dutch entered the
GDR as private visitors, gathered
at prearranged addresses,
and, with East Germans, cycled
to rural parts of the GDR and
discussed world politics and
disarmament initiatives.38
In 1985, IKV Secretary Faber
and East German Vicar Rainer
Eppelmann (a prominent figure
in the East German opposition
scene) concluded a
personal contract to work
together for peace. Many participants
in the Groningen-GDR
exchange decided to do the
same and committed themselves
to not using violence
against each other in case of a
war. According to the signatories,
in doing this, they contributed
to “detente from below.”39
Although their activities were
relatively low-profile and not
aimed at threatening the GDR
system, the cycle tours
were betrayed by their
own success as the Stasi
got wind of them. Large
international groups
peddling, for example,
from Karl Marx City
(Chemnitz) to Stralsund,
could not stay
unnoticed, especially
after their frequency
increased to three or
four times a year.
Veterans of the Bausoldaten
were suspect to
begin with in the eyes of
the MfS, especially
when they organized
meetings with other
Bausoldaten and Western
draft resisters.
Indeed, the Stasi had
been carrying out operations
against the idea of “social
peace service” as an alternative
to military service since at least
1981.40 (Vicar Eppleman, in
fact, had been a leader in the
“social peace service” effort.)
HA XX, the department
charged with dealing with the
churches and opposition circles,
learned that Dutch participants
planned to publish stories
about their bicycle tours and
experiences in the GDR in
Dutch church and peace magazines,
and, in 1984, Peace Shop
members initiated a letter campaign
on behalf of Amnesty
International for the release of
arrested East German
dissidents.41
Such activity fit perfectly in the communist vision of class enemies
conspiring to create domestic unrest.
A member of the Peace Shop in Groningen
and an East German dissident exchange personal
peace treaties.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Such activity fit perfectly in
the communist vision of class
enemies conspiring from outside
the system to create
domestic unrest, and the bicycle
tours thus became objects of
intensive surveillance. In 1983,
the Stasi started several Operative
Vorgange (intelligence
operations aimed at arresting
dissidents) against former Bausoldaten
who had participated
in the tours. HA XX recruited
several East Germans as informal
agents “mit Feindkontakt”
(in contact with the enemy),
who reported on all the meetings
and preparations.42
Although bicycle tour participants
kept their distance from
IKV officials, HA XX and the
HVA nevertheless increasingly
suspected them of being partners
of the IKV and executors
of the IKV’s grand strategy of
developing a “pseudopacifist,
bloc–transcending peace movement.”
By way of confirmation
of this, one Stasi report quotes
a Dutch activist as saying
“When there are no soldiers on
both sides, there will be no
weapons used.”43
In the belief that the Peace
Shop was helping dissidents,
the Stasi was not mistaken.
The activists had indeed given
their East German contacts a
typewriter and helped finance
Bausoldaten activities with
2,000 Dutch guilders.
With growing Dutch contacts
in the so-called Political Underground
Forces (Politische Untergrundtätigkeit—
PUT), which the
East German authorities saw as
a threat to communist rule,
increased international pressure
on the GDR, and a perceived
potential for embarrassment
during Erich Honecker’s planned
June 1987 visit to the Netherlands,
the MfS tried to obstruct
and manipulate cross-border
exchanges. HA XX began an
Operativer Vorgang against the
Dutch organizer of the bicycle
tours, Bert Noppers, who was
described as the inspirator and
organisator of the PUT tours.
As part of its attack on Noppers,
HA XX used a letter from
Noppers to an East German
friend in which he wrote that
Dutch intelligence had tried to
recruit him in 1983 to report on
his East German contacts.
Although Noppers stated in his
letter that he refused, the HA
immediately listed him as a
probable foreign intelligence
agent. It then attempted to collect
evidence to indict Noppers
for hostile agitation against the
East German state and for disseminating
information to foreign
intelligence agencies or
other foreign organizations to
discredit the GDR. If convicted,
he faced two to 12 years of
imprisonment.44
Nothwithstanding such
threats, the Peace Shop organized
a protest against East
German border controls in
1987, building a model Berlin
Wall of cardboard boxes
through Groningen and drawing
media attention to the condition
of their dissident friends
in the GDR. Although the peace
The bicycle tours fit perfectly in the communist vision of class enemies
conspiring to create domestic unrest.
Demonstrators by a cardboard “Berlin Wall” built through Groningen in 1987.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 11
activists also criticized the
West European and Dutch contribution
to the armaments
race, these acts had no impact
on the activities of HA XX.45
Stepped-up HA XX activities
included the recruitment as
informal agents of three GDR
participants in the Peace Shop
exchanges. Codenamed Karlheinz,
Betty, and Romeo, they
reported all of their activities to
HA XX. Romeo was sent abroad
to visit the Peace Shop in
Groningen in July 1988. However,
the department could not
find enough evidence to prosecute
the East German participants
or arrest the Dutch
organizer.
Even by the standards of the
East German Penal Code, the
activists were just not subversive
enough. The Dutch activists
did not advocate open criticism
or revolution. As Noppers put it
during an interview in 2006, “If
the East Germans wanted to
topple the regime, they had to do
it by themselves. We came from
abroad and did not want to tell
them what to do. And although
we were no friends of communism,
we had enough criticism to
pass on capitalism and materialism
at home.”46 Moreover, the
East German government did
not want the MfS to make random
arrests, since that would
cause too much damage to the
economic and political relations
the GDR had established by
then.
Nevertheless, MfS surveillance
continued. HA XX ordered
continuation of the operations
against Noppers, inspired by the
same suspicions against the
Dutch activist.47 Although the
MfS knew that Moscow had
shifted policies and now aimed
at cooperation with the IKV and
other West European peace
organisations, HA XX was still
plotting in April 1989 to use
intercepted inquiries by the
Peace Shop to members of the
East German network to recruit
more informal agents.48
Only in October 1989 were the
Operativer Vorgange against the
East German Bausoldaten and
against Noppers called off. They
ended partly because of a lack of
evidence and partly because the
Stasi had already begun cleaning
up its files in the face of
growing unrest and pending revolution.
On 24 November 1989,
15 days after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the Stasi finally closed
its files on Noppers.49
In Sum: Tactical Gains,
Strategic Loss
During the last decade of its
existence, the MfS was successful
in tactical terms. It succeeded
in running one operation
to collect military intelligence,
managed to infiltrate and
manipulate most IKV contacts in
the GDR, penetrated the Peace
Shop, and started an Operativ
Vorgang against the Dutch coordinator
of East European peace
tours. Moreover, there is reason
to believe that the MfS employed
more Dutch informal agents in
the 1980s than are discussed
here but whose records remain
undiscovered.
The Peace Shop, on the corner, in Groningen.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Endnotes
1. “Gauck-Behörde iritiert über Aufgeregtheit im Westen um Stasi-Akten,” in
Magdeburger Volksstimme, 28 April 2000.
2. Hubertus Knabe, Die unterwanderte Republik. Stasi im Westen (Berlin,
1999); Helmut Müller-Enbergs, Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für
Staatssicherheit. Teil 2: Anleitungen für Arbeiten mit Agenten, Kundschaftern
und Spionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 1998); Müller-
In the overall, strategic setting,
however, the Ministry of State
Security failed in its mission to
preserve the security of the GDR.
•First, by entangling its foreign
intelligence operations with
domestic security interests, the
Stasi focused on the foreign
inspiration of domestic opposition
at the expense of understanding
that dissent in the GDR
drew on the system’s own economic,
social, military, and political
weaknesses and the
government’s abuses of its population.
•Second, the MfS itself became
part of the problem instead of
part of the solution, as the
expansion of the security apparatus
from the 1970s on acted as a
driver for even more protests.
•Third, activities of the IKV and
other Dutch peace initiatives like
the Peace Shop were blown up out
of proportion, and those in the
GDR who were in touch with
them were deemed to be guilty of
high treason. In this intellectual
strait-jacket, the Stasi was
blinded to useful insights and
could not see that the Dutch
movements gave the Soviet bloc
opportunities to exploit genuine
divisions in NATO.
•Finally, when the Stasi got it
right, it could not persuade its
leadership. In May 1987, the
HVA issued an study of Dutch
foreign and military politicies
before Honecker’s state visit to
the Netherlands. The analysis
precisely listed the deviations of
Dutch politics from the US and
NATO lines. (The Dutch
denounced SDI, favoured a
nuclear test ban and prolongation
of the ABM treaty.)
Honecker, however, made no
effort to play into these differences
and only uttered the usual
clichès about peace-loving socialist
countries. To him, the Netherlands
remained part and parcel
of the imperialist block.50 Painfully
collected and sound intelligence
was made useless by
incapable and ideologically
deformed party leaders.
❖ ❖ ❖
During its last decade, the MfS had tactical success. Strategically,
however, it failed to preserve the security of the GDR
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 13
Enbergs, “Die Erforschung der West-Arbeit des MfS,” in Suckut und Weber
(eds.), Stasi-Akten, 240–69; Joachim Lampe, Juristische Aufarbeitung der
Westspionage des MfS. Eine vorläufige Bilanz. BF informiert Nr. 24 (BStU,
Berlin, 1999).
3. Eva Horn, “Das wissen vom Feind. Erkenntnis und Blindheid von Geheimdiensten,”
in Wolbert K. Schmidt, et al., Geheimhaltung und Transparanez.
Demokratische Kontrolle der Geheimdienste im internationalen Vergleich
(Berlin, 2007), 257–77. Here: 259.
4. Jens Gieseke, “Annäherungen und Fragen an die Meldungen aus der
Republik,” in idem (ed.), Staatssicherheit und Gesellschaft. Studien zum Herrschaftsalltag
in der DDR (Göttingen 2007), 79–98, here: 89–90.
5. Vgl. Query in the SIRA database 14, Druckauftrag Nr. 12839, AR 7/SG03,
Nr. AU 2585/05 Z.
6. HA XVIII, “Pläne und Massnahmen feindlicher Geheimdienste gegen Auslandsvertretungen
und langfriestige Delegierungskader der DDR im nichtsozialistischen
Ausland im Jahre 1985.” BStU MfS HA XVIII, 32–33.
7. “Vorgangsanalyse zum Vorgang Aorta,” 15 July 1986; “Aufgabenstellung
AA 1986. Fortschreibung der Sicherheigsanalyse ‘Haupt,’” 1 March 1986;
“Information über die ndl. Sicherheitsdienste. Auswertung der Broschüre “De
BVD en de Inlichtingendiensten, Hrsg. by PSP, Amsterdam 1983,” 1984.
BStU MfS HA I 1682, 25–28; 90–94; 127–29.
8. For example “Jahresabschlussbericht 1981 über die Ergebnisse der Funkabwehrtätigkeit,”
16 November 1981, in which West German, British and
Dutch radiocommunications are mapped. BStU MfS HA II 25043, 1–39.
9. Frits Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD. Spionage en contraspionage in Nederland
(Amsterdam, 2004). See also Dick Engelen, Frontdient. De BVD in de
Koude Oorlog (Amsterdam, 2007).
10. Beatrice de Graaf, Over de Muur. De DDR, de Nederlandse kerken en de
vredesbeweging (Amsterdam, 2004), or De Graaf, Über die Mauer. Die DDR,
die niederländischen Kirchen und die Friedensbewegung (Münster, 2007)
11. RoD Den Haag, “Fortschreibung der Sicherheitanalyze zur RoD im Ausbildungsjahr
1987/1988,” 11 November 1988. BStU HA I, 1682: 7–10.
12. HA I 1682, S. 11.
13. RoD Den Haag, “Fortschreibung der Sicherheitanalyze zur RoD im Ausbildungsjahr
1987/1988,” 11 November 1988. BStU HA I, 1682: 7–10.
14. “Information über die Streitkräfte der Niederlande,” nr. 46/88, 27 January
1988. BStU MfS HA XVIII 91: 202–15; “Information über den militärischen
Beitrag der Niederlande zu den Streitkräften der NATO,” 29 May
1987. BStU MfS HVA 47: 60–79.
15. Telegrams and reports to MfS headquarters from The Hague: 21 March
1984, 18 January 1989, 31 March 1989, security report “Fortschreibung der
Sicherheitsanalyse zur Rod im Ausbildungsjahr 1987/1988” of 18 November
1988. BStU, MfS HA I 1682: 1–11.
16. Several reports on IM “Abruf” by “Haupt” and other MfS-personnel. BStU
MfS HA I 1682: 29–163.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
17. Hilmar, “Zum Einsatz in den NL,” 1985; “Sicherheitsanalyse zum Vorgang
AM-V ‘Abruf’,” 31 January 1986. BStU MfS HA I 1682: 58–63, 81–84.
18. “Angaben zum Nachrichtendienst der Streitkräfte der NL, insbesondere
der Landstreitkräfte,” 4 June 1985, Den Haag. BStU MfS HA I 1682: 39–52.
19. Peter Volten, Brezhnev’s ‘Peace Program.’ Success or Failure? Soviet
Domestic Political Process and Power. Academisch Proefschrift (Emmen,
1981).
20. Letter, Hans van der Velde (secretary of the National Committee “Initiatief
Internationale Stafette”) to the East German Peace Council, Amsterdam,
12 July 1979; Letter Kurt Hölker (deputy secretary-general of the Peace
Council) to Hans van der Velde, Berlin, 7 August 1979. Both at Bundesarchiv
Stiftung Arbeiterparteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR
(thereafter BArch SAPMO), DZ 9 463.2411; Carel Horstmeier, “Stop de Neutronenbom!
The last mass-action of the CPN and the Moscow-Berlin-Amsterdam
triangle,” in Carel Horstmeier etal (eds.), Around Peter the Great: Three
Centuries of Russian-Dutch Relations (Groningen 1997), 65–77.
21. De Graaf, Over de Muur, 113; Jochen Staadt, “Die SED und die Generale
für den Frieden,” in Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke (eds.), Die verführte
Friedensbewegung, 123–140.
22. East German Peace Council, “Information,” 22 March 1978, 1, 6, 11, BArch SAPMO
DZ 9 463.2411; Neue Zeit, 2 July 1979. East German Peace Council, “Maßnahmeplan,”
February 1981, 2, BArch SAPMO DZ 9 450.2354.
23. Jan Willem Honig, Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance. The Case
of the Netherlands (London: Westport, 1993), 211–12; Ronald Jeurissen, Peace
and Religion: An Empirical-Theological Study of the Motivational Effects of
Religious Peace Attitudes on Peace Action (Kampen, 1993), 47; Philip Everts,
Public Opinion, the Churches and Foreign Policy: Studies of Domestic Factors
in the Making of Dutch Foreign Policy (Leiden, 1983); Jürgen Maruhn and
Manfred Wilke, eds., Die verführte Friedensbewegung: Der Einfluß des Ostens
auf die Nachrüstungsdebatte (München: 2002); Udo Baron, Kalter Krieg und
heisser Frieden. Der Einfluss der SED und ihrer westdeutschen Verbündeten
auf die Partei ‘Die Grünen’ (Münster 2003).
24. Mient Jan Faber, “Brief van het IKV-secretariaat aan alle IKV-kernen
over Polen kort na 13 december 1981,” in: Faber et al. (eds.), Zes jaar IKVcampagne
(Den Haag, 1983), 133–34; “Open letter of Charter 77 to the Interchurch
Peace Council,” 17 August 1982. BArch SAPMO DZ 9 585.2879.
25. Report of Hauptabteilung XX (HA XX) for the Stellvertreter des Ministers,
Genossen Generalleutnant Mittig, “Negative Aktivitäten von Personen
des ‘Interkirchlichen Friedensrates’ (IKV) der Niederlande,” 9 August 1982,
BStU MfS HA XX ZMA 1993/5, 34–37, 56–57.
26. Report of the HA XX/4 (Stasidepartment for church and opposition matters),
“Subversive Aktivitäten kirchlicher Personen der Niederlande,” 15 June
1982, BStU MfS HA XX ZMA 1993/5, 21–22; Letter, Christoph Demke (Office
of the East German Church Organisation) to Staatssekretär für Kirchenfragen,
Klaus Gysi, 9 August 1982, Berlin, “Sekretariat 3827-1632/82,” Rep.
B3 Nr. 711, Archive KPS Magdeburg.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 15
27. BStU MfS HA XX AKG-VSH. ZAIG 5. SLK 10964. ZPDB 2082010579.
Erfassungsnr. 40438/1590/1993; HA XX AKG-VSH. ZAIG 5 1009. SLK 10994.
ZPDB 2082010587. ZMA 3420/1993–1580. VSH-Karteikarten are register
cards, not a file. In June 1982 Stasi started an Operativ Vorgang (file) on
Mient Jan Faber and Wolfgang Müller.
28. Report of the HA XX/4, “Interkirchlicher Friedensrat der Niederlande,”
October/November 1982, BStU MfS HA XX/4 1917, 1–5; In the mid-1980s,
IKV was mentioned in a list of approximately 1,000 “Zielobjekte” (targets) of
the Stasi’s Reconnaissance Service, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung.
“Zielobjekte der HVA - alphabetische Liste,” BStU ASt Gera BV Gera/Abt. XV
0187, 21–39, in Knabe, West-Arbeit des MfS, 518–54. See 537.
29. “Vertreter holländischer Friedensbewegung dürfte nicht in die DDR,”
ADN-Information, 29 July 1982, BStU MfS HA XX ZMA 1993/4, 13.
30. Office of the East German Churches (BEK-Sekretariat), “Arbeitsbeziehungen
zwischen dem Bund der Ev. Kirchen in der DDR und dem Raad van
Kerken in den Niederlanden und einzelnen Gliedkirchen und Gemeinden,”
November 1982, LDC NHK ROS 735.
31. Clemens Vollnhals, Die kirchenpolitische Abteilung des Ministeriums für
Staatssicherheit. BF informiert 16/1997 (Berlin 1997). Concerning the strategy
of differentiation, the following orders were relevant: Richtlinien zur
Bearbeitungs Operativer Vorgänge (RL 1/76), Operative Personenkontrollen
(RL 1/81), Direktive zur IM-Führung (RL 1/79).
32. East German Peace Council, “Maßnahmeplan,” Berlin, April 1981, 4,
BArch SAPMO DZ 9 K295.1578; East German Peace Council, “Aktivitäten der
Rüstungsgegner im Monat November 1981,” “Niederlande,” 23, BArch
SAPMO DZ 9 450.2354.
33. E.g., Ton Crijnen, “Waarom Mient Jan Faber niet welkom is in de DDR,”
De Tijd, 31 December 1982.
34. BStU MfS Abteilung Rostock, OV “Integration” 3/92.
35. “Verslag van uitspraken van bisschop W. Krusche op de bijeenkomst met
de Raad van Kerken te Amersfoort d.d. 7-9-82,” Series 3, Nr. 32, Utrecht
County Archive, Reformed Churches in the Netherland, General Diaconal
Council (Het Utrechts Archief, Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, Algemeen
Diakonaal Beraad); Letter, Prof. Berkhof to Vorsitzender des Bundes
der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR (Krusche), 26 Juy 1982, Amersfoort,
Rep. B3 Nr. 711, Archive KPS Magdeburg; Letter, Prof. Berkhof to Faber,
2 July 1982, Amersfoort, LDC NHK ROS/IKV Box 15.
36. All letters at the (Dutch) International Institute for Social History (IISH)
in Amsterdam, Box IKV 455; “Verslag Oost-Europadiscussie op de Campagneraad
van 26 februari,” in Kernblad 3, March 1983, IISH Box IKV 453.
37. Interview with Mient Jan Faber, 10 September 2001, The Hague.
38. Interview with Bert Noppers (former participant in these contacts and
supporter of the Peace Shop), 20 March 2006, Utrecht.
39. “Network News,” in: Peace Magazin, 1 (December 1985): 1, 30.
A Cold War Intelligence Battleground
16 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
40. Uwe Koch, Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, die Wehrdienstverweigerer
der DDR und die Bausoldaten der Nationalen Volksarmee. Eine übersicht
über den Forschungsstand. Die Landesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR in Sachsen-Anhalt und Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachbeiträge 6 (Magdeburg 1999); Robert-Havemann-
Archiv (ed.), Zivilcourage und Kompromiss, Bausoldaten in der DDR 1964 –
1990, Bausoldatenkongress Potsdam, 3.-5. September 2004 (Berlin 2005).
41. Vredeswinkel Groningen, “Schrijf een brief!!!!!’[write a letter!!!!!], around
January 1984. Matthias Domaschk Archive Berlin, Box “Erik de Graaf.”
42. OV “Schwaben.” BStU MfS BV Frankfurt (Oder) AOP 1430/89; Abteilung
XX/4, “Information über feindlich-negative Aktivitäten zur Organisierung und
Inspirierung politischer Untergrundtätigkeit,” Frankfurt (Oder), 22 March
1985. BStU MfS OV “Radtour,” 1091/87, Anlage I, 84–86.
43. OV “Schwaben.” BStU MfS BV Frankfurt (Oder) AOP 1430/89; Abteilung
XX/4, “Information über feindlich-negative Aktivitäten zur Organisierung und
Inspirierung politischer Untergrundtätigkeit,” Frankfurt (Oder), 22 March
1985. BStU MfS OV “Radtour,” 1091/87, Anlage I, 85.
44. Abteilung XX/4, “Eröffnungsbericht zum OV ‘Radtour’,” Frankfurt (Oder)
3 September 1987. BStU MfS OV “Radtour,” 1091/87, Anlage I, 7–12.
45. Abteilung IX/2, “Strafrechtliche Einschätzung zum operativen Ausgangsmaterial
‘Radtour’ der Abteilung XX,” Frankfurt (Oder) 10 September 1987.
BStU MfS OV ‘Radtour’ 1091/87, Anlage I, 22–23.
46. Interview with Bert Noppers, 20 March 2006, Utrecht.
47. Abteilung XX/4, “Sachstandbericht zum OV ‘Radtour,’ 1091/87,” Frankfurt
(Oder), 22 July 1988. BStU MfS OV “Radtour,” 1091/87, Anlage II, 47–51.
48. Abteilung XX/4, “Dienstreisebericht,” Frankfurt (Oder), 20 June 1988;
Abteilung XX, “Information zur ‘Ost-West-Gruppe’ Groningen (Niederlande),”
Frankfurt (Oder), 5 April 1989. BStU MfS OV “Radtour” 1091/87, Anlage II,
18–21 and 131–133.
49. Abteilung XX/4, “Abschlussbericht zum operativ-Vorgang ‘Radtour,’
Reg.nr. V/1091/87,” Frankfurt (Oder), 24 November 1989. BStU MfS OV “Radtour,”
1091/87, Anlage II, 189–192.
50. “Information über aktuelle Aspekte der Außen- und Innenpolitik der Niederlande
im Zusammenhang mit dem offiziellen Besuch des Genossen
Honecker vom 3.-5.6.1987,” 21 May 1987. BStU MfS HVA 47, 85–91.
❖ ❖ ❖
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 17
Turning a Cold War Scheme into Reality
Engineering the Berlin Tunnel
G . . .
Fifty years ago, the CIA
embarked on a project to intercept
Soviet and East German
messages transmitted via
underground cable. Intelligence
was collected to
determine the best place to hit
the target, and then concrete
planning for a new collection
site was begun.
Early in 1951 when I was working
in the Engineering Division
of the Office of Communications,
I received a message from
some people in the office of the
Deputy Director of Plans—specifically
the chief of Foreign
Intelligence/Staff D (FI/D), and
a member of his team—requesting
a meeting.1 The meeting
was short. The only question
they asked was whether a tunnel
could be dug in secret. My
reply was that one could dig a
tunnel anywhere, but to build
one in secret would depend on
its size, take more time, and
cost more money. After the
meeting, I was transferred to
FI/D. Thus began planning for
the construction of the Berlin
Tunnel.
We started building the tunnel
in August 1954 and completed
it in February 1955. It was
1,476 feet in length; 3,100 tons
of soil were removed; 125 tons
of steel liner plate and 1,000
cubic yards of grout were consumed.
This was not a small
operation!
Debate has swirled around the
net intelligence value of the
operation.2 But the completion
of this demanding project—
accomplished in secret and
under exacting conditions—is a
tribute to the resourcefulness
and expertise of an outstanding
team of professionals.
Learning as We Went
Prior to this project, my tunnel
experience was limited to several
night-shift visits to the
Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel as a
student civil engineer. Constructed
in 1948 and somewhat
unique, the tunnel extended
from Battery Park in lower
Manhattan to South Brooklyn.
It was designed for two 18-foot
bores, which were mostly
blasted and drilled in solid
rock. The East River crossing
presented a problem, however.
1 Staff D was a SIGINT component.
2 Accounts of the tunnel project covering its
conception and execution, its compromise by
British spy George Blake, and Moscow’s delay in
closing it down include: David C. Martin,
Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row,
1980); Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of
Allen Dulles (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1994); David E. Murphy, Sergei A.
Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground
Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); and
David Stafford, Spies Beneath Berlin
(Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2003).
“ The tunnel was
1,476 feet in length and
consumed 125 tons of
steel liner plate and
1,000 cubic yards of
grout . . . This was not
”
a small operation!
The author of this article served in
the CIA Directorate of Operations.
The article, originally classified,
appeared in Studies 48, 2 (2004). It
was reviewed and portions redacted
for declassification by the Historical
Collections Division of the
Information Management Staff.
Berlin Tunnel
18 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
“ Soil from the tunnel
would fill more than
20 living rooms in an
average American
”
home!
At the confluence of the East
River and the Hudson River,
there was a deep submarine
canyon, a leftover from the
extensive land erosion caused
by the violent runoff of melt
waters from the retreating Continental
Glacier. The canyon
was filled with the muck and
detritus of eons of erosion. This
fact required that a pressurized
shield, solely for the
prevention of blowouts on the
East River crossing, had to be
moved the entire length of the
tunnel. The concept of such a
shield surfaced in design discussions
for the Berlin Tunnel
project. The Brooklyn-Battery
Tunnel demonstrated the magnitude
of the job of marshaling
the experienced personnel,
materials, and equipment for
the huge task of constructing a
tunnel and disposing of the
excavated soil. Work on the 18-
foot bore tunnel could not have
been done in silence. These
matters were a warning,
because silence would be a top
priority in constructing the Berlin
Tunnel in secret.
Design Decisions
Once the Berlin project received
a green light, design specifications
had to be determined;
men and materials assembled;
and questions of site selection,
training, and transportation
answered. The big question
that loomed was how to dispose
of the tons of soil that would be
excavated! Rough calculations
showed that the amount of soil
expected to be brought out from
the tunnel and vertical shaft
would fill to the brim more than
20 living rooms in an average
American home! Security and
silence dictated that not one
cubic foot of soil be removed
from the site. A warehouse,
with a basement for the storage
of the excavated soil and a
first floor reserved for recorders
and signal equipment, was
the solution.
My task began with an inspection
of existing tunnels in the
Washington, DC, area, which
included utility bores, pedestrian
walkways, storm drains,
and railroad maintenance tunnels.
From this research, I
concluded that our tunnel
should be 6 feet in diameter
with a structure of steel-flanged
corrugated liner plates—the 6-
foot diameter would provide a
comfortable working room at
the tunnel face. Next came
research at the Library of Congress
to check the available
literature dealing with earth
pressures on tunnels. I already
had two textbooks and found
three relevant papers published
by the American Society
of Civil Engineers. Together,
these provided the procedures I
needed to start the mathematical
analysis of the tunnel
structure.
In the spring of 1953, I flew to
Frankfurt, Germany, to meet
with a senior case officer at the
CIA station. The officer told me
that the tunnel site had not yet
been selected. He also advised
me that Lt. Col. Leslie M. Gross
had been selected as the tunnel’s
resident engineer. He
expressed regret that I had not
been selected. I told him not to
worry.3
The next subject we discussed
was a meeting with the British
in London. We would attend
this meeting with Bill Harvey,
chief of our Berlin base. At the
beginning of the meeting, I
started to discuss some notes I
had on the unfinished mathematical
analysis of the tunnel
structure. Clearly the attendees
were not interested in
mathematics. The discussion
turned to the matter of the form
of the tunnel design. The British
proposed using heavy
concrete blocks, which were
common in the London Underground.
I countered with the
idea of using steel liner plates,
which would be lighter and easier
to use in the tunnel and at
the tunnel face. This proposal
was accepted.
3 Time magazine of 7 May 1956 reported
that some Army people saw “friends whom
they knew to be engineers appearing in
Berlin wearing the insignia of the Signal
Corps.”
Berlin Tunnel
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 19
“ The ‘circuit method’ of
computing earth
pressures on tunnels
required solving six
simultaneous
”
equations.
The next subject was a question
of using a shield. I did not
offer an opinion because it was
a topic that I felt should be discussed
with Les Gross. Bill
Harvey got the impression that
I did not know the difference
between a shield and a coat-ofarms.
When we returned to
Frankfurt, it was suggested
that I make a drawing of a
shield. Normally, a shield—
such as the one used on the
Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel—
would not be used in a tunnel
as small as 6 feet. Other methods,
such as poling, would be
used to prevent a collapse of the
tunnel roof. However, I drew an
engineering plan for a 6-foot
shield, and Bill Harvey later
used the drawing in his request
for final approval of the
tunnel.4
I had my first meeting with
headquarters. A short conference
resulted in an agreement
that a shield should be used. A
shield would have the added
4 A shield is made of a steel tube slightly
larger than the tunnel bore. Hydraulic
jacks are fitted inside the outer rim opposite
the cutting edge. The shield, supported
by an external framework, is assembled
in a shaft at the beginning of a tunnel. The
shield then makes its first shove forward,
and the face is dug out until 12 or more
inches of soil have been removed. The
jacks are retracted and liner plates are installed
in the space uncovered when the
soil is removed. The flanges of the liner
plates are bolted to a reinforced concrete
wall and then bolted to each other, completing
the first ring of the structure of the
tunnel. The shield is then moved forward
for construction of the second ring.
advantage of keeping the alignment
of the tunnel on course.
We selected a prime contractor
for the liner plates and shield,
negotiated a classified contract,
and work commenced.
Assembling Men and
Materials
Working out of an office in one
of the World War II temporary
buildings along the Reflecting
Pool near the Lincoln Memorial,
Les started the process of
recruiting his team. He selected
Corps of Engineers officers and
non-commissioned officers. He
also began to look into a site
out West where the liner plates
and shield could be assembled
for training for the up-coming
real thing.
Les left the structural analysis
to me. Ordinarily, earth pressure
on a tunnel is figured at
four points: the overhead, both
sides, and the invert. This technique
did not seem adequate. I
spent nearly a week at the
Library of Congress searching
for a better way of analyzing
earth pressures. I found two
technical papers that offered a
better approach. The papers
discussed the “circuit method”
of computing earth pressures
on tunnels. It was a sort of circumferential
calculus. The
downside was that the circuit
method of calculation required
solving six simultaneous equations!
Perhaps this
sophisticated method was a bit
of overkill; however, the design
assumptions called for precise
planning. The tunnel not only
needed to be able to withstand
a dead load of 10 or more feet of
soil overburden, but also had to
bear a potential surcharge
load—to wit, Soviet or East
German 60-ton tanks riding
down Schoenefelder Chausee or
maneuvering around the open
field above the tunnel.
While Les narrowed the search
for a site to test the installation
of the shield and liner
plates to New Mexico, I flew
back to London for a meeting
with Bill Harvey. We traveled
with one of Bill’s British colleagues
to a location to view the
operation of the vertical shield
needed to gain access to the
Soviet communications cables.
The vertical shield was demonstrated
by the British sappers
who would operate it at the
site. This was a process that
required extreme patience and
skill. During the motor trip, I
suggested that as a cover for
the tunnel site, we should build
one or two communications stations
that would exchange false
traffic. This idea was met by icy
stares.
Berlin Tunnel
20 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Site Preparation
Drawing on the clandestine
sources of the Berlin base, Bill
Harvey decided to locate the
operation in a rural area of the
American Sector southwest of
Berlin known as Altglienecke.
The target cables—two estimated
to be in good shape, and
a third, in poor shape—ran in a
ditch on the west side of Schoenefelder
Chausee in the Soviet
Sector. The aiming point for the
tunnel was about 300 yards
north of a graveyard.
Tunnels are usually kept on
line and grade by surveys conducted
in the tunnel and on the
ground above it by transits and
calibrated steel tapes. A surface
survey, however, was
obviously inappropriate for a
secret tunnel. Having no lasers,
we had to use other methods.
Drawing on the best technical
resources of the time, several
photographic over-flights were
ordered. One flight used glass
plates for maximum accuracy.
The glass plates were sent to
the Agency’s fledgling air photoanalysis
unit. They conducted
air-photogrammetry studies to
determine distance and elevation.
The engineering and
geologic analysis of the other
photographs showed the site to
be underlain by well-drained
deposits of sandy loam. There
was a possibility of encountering
some “perched water
tables”—where a layer of
impervious clay traps a small
quantity of water—but this was
not considered a problem.
We also used a newly developed
electronic distance
measuring system (EDMS). An
agent faked a flat tire on the
side of the road by the aiming
point. While working on the
tire, he placed a small device on
the hood of the car. The device
received and transmitted data
in the EDMS system. Thus, air
photogrammetry and electronic
measurement fixed the coordinates
of the target cables.
Next, under the supervision of
a Berlin-based Corps of Engineers
unit, the requisite
“warehouse” was constructed on
the site, using mostly local contractors
and available
materials. Keeping the plans
secret was a constant challenge.
Time magazine reported
that a civilian engineer had
quit the construction project in
disgust because the blueprints
seemed crazy. “Why build a cellar
big enough to drive through
with a dump truck?” he asked.5
Good point. Warehouses were
usually built on reinforced concrete
slabs poured on welldrained,
compacted sub-bases.
A warehouse with a basement
normally would require columns
and beams, which were
not incorporated into our plans.
Our intention was to use the
basement for the storage of the
excavated soil, so columns and
5 Time, 7 May 1956.
beams ultimately would not be
necessary. The civilian engineer
who quit was not the only
one to raise an eyebrow. The
Army Chief of Engineers finally
resolved the design controversy.
Calling it an
“experiment,” he ordered the
warehouse built as planned,
with a basement and no columns
and beams.
From Training to Action
The two British sappers who
would play a key role in the
tunnel construction were
invited to the New Mexico test
site to observe the operation of
the shield in conjunction with
the liner plates. The time had
come to demobilize the test site
and ship all of the equipment to
Berlin. The last step was to
pack up all of the unit’s files—
consisting of requisitions,
Berlin Tunnel
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 21
“ Two British sappers,
who would play a key
role in the tunnel
construction, were
invited to the New
”
Mexico test site.
receipts, and disbursements—
for shipment to CIA headquarters,
where they were locked in
a safe.
All along, Les had planned to
send the equipment to a US
Army Quartermaster Corps
boxing facility near Richmond,
Virginia, for final packing for
shipment to Berlin. Now he discovered
that the boxing plant
was due for closure and he
quickly had to negotiate a 30-
day hold. At Richmond, the
metal parts were sprayed with
a rubberized compound to eliminate
clanking as they were
taken into the tunnel and
assembled. We wanted to avoid
any kind of cowbell chorus deep
in the tunnel. The shield, liner
plates, conveyor belts, and a
small, battery-powered forklift
were shipped to Hamburg, Germany.
From Hamburg, this
most secret cargo was transported
to West Berlin on an
ordinary goods train—no armed
guards or security arrangements
of any kind. The cargo
arrived in West Berlin without
incident.
The dig began in August 1954.
A 10-foot-diameter vertical
shaft, 10 feet deep, was excavated
15 feet inside the
warehouse foundation. The
shield was assembled in this
shaft below the basement floor.
The excavation of the tunnel
started with a sequence of
push, dig, retract, assemble
liner-plate ring, and repeat. An
unanticipated messy problem
developed about 10 feet beyond
the tunnel portal when the
shield passed under the leach
field of the compound’s sanitary
system. The drainage
problem was quickly solved
with a pump. History does not
record what was used to alleviate
the odor!
The dig proceeded. A woodenrail
track was built to keep the
forklift on course. About oneeighth
of the spoil never left the
tunnel. Sandbags were filled
and stacked halfway up the
sides of the finished tunnel.
They were secured with steel
cables and gave the tunnel
cross section a T-square look.
The benches formed by the
sandbags were used to support
and store air-conditioning ducts
and power and message cables
running back and forth between
the equipment-room amplifiers
and the Ampex recorders,
which packed the first floor of
the warehouse.
The operation of the shield
resulted in an overcut of 2 1/ 2
inches. This provided space for
the liner plates, but left a 1/2-
inch void between the tunnel
and the undisturbed earth
above. This void had to be filled
in order to prevent subsidence
of the earth above the tunnel.
About every fourth liner-plate
ring had “grout plugs,”
threaded cores that filled holes
used for pumping grout into the
void. The plugs were screwed
Tunnel interior with wooden rails for forklift and sandbag “benches” for utility lines
and ventilation ducts.
Berlin Tunnel
22 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
out, grout under high pressure
was pumped in, and then the
plugs were replaced. The grout
selected was called “Vollclay,” a
molecular composite of clay,
minerals, and other ingredients.
Once, a full boxcar of
Vollclay disappeared between
Chicago and Baltimore! It took
five days for the Office of Logistics
to find the shipment, but
the grout reached Berlin without
delaying the progress on
the tunnel.
The British team of sappers
started—and completed in the
spring of 1955—the construction
of the vertical shaft needed
to gain access to the Soviet
communications cables. This
was the most delicate and
tedious job in the entire process.
The vertical shaft was
carved out using a “window
blind” shield: A slot was opened
and about an inch of soil was
removed; then that slot was
closed and the next one opened.
This sequence was repeated
until the target cables were
reached, a process that required
extreme patience and skill.
The tap of the first cable was
completed in May 1955. A team
of British specialists started the
work of transferring the cable
voice and signal circuits to the
recording equipment. The full
tapes were collected and sent to
London and Washington.
Unexpected Development
On two occasions, I was invited
to visit the tunnel site. I
declined, suggesting that, without
a good reason for such a
visit, we might be turning the
tunnel site into a tourist attraction.
Then, a good reason
surfaced.
The electronic equipment room,
located under the roadway, was
jammed with amplifiers, transformers,
and tuners. All of
these devices used vacuum
tubes—“valves,” under British
nomenclature—that were high
heat generators. The maximum
expected heat load of these generators
had been used to
calculate the required level of
air-conditioning. Something
was wrong, however, because
the temperature in the equipment
room was rising.
This problem had to be solved
before winter set in. Some cold
morning, a frost-free black
mark might appear on the roadway
over the equipment room,
perhaps extending into the field
between the road and the warehouse,
calling attention to
something strange occurring
below the surface. Emergency
action was needed.
Berlin Tunnel
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 23
A chilled-water air-conditioning
system was the only
solution because there was no
room for extra ducts on the
sandbag benches. Such a system,
including about 1500 feet
of newly developed 3/4-inch
plastic irrigation tubing, was
shipped to the site. The tubing
fitted nicely alongside the existing
air ducts.
We still needed a way to monitor
the temperature in and
above the tunnel. With assistance
from the Office of
Logistics, we checked out a
company in New Jersey named
Wallace and Tiernan Products,
Inc. Primarily a manufacturer
of altimeters and surveying
equipment, the company also
made a remote temperature
recording system consisting of
sensors, a data-recording station,
and connecting cables. We
purchased the system and
shipped it to Berlin.
As the Washington “expert,” I
followed with an engineering
drawing of the planned locations
and elevations of the
sensors that were to go into the
earth above the tunnel. The
first job was to install the sensors,
since the plan called for
statistical analysis to determine
if observed differences in
temperatures were random or
significant. The grout plugs
now had a second purpose. A
number were removed and
holes were drilled in each to
accommodate a sensor and its
cable. Eleven sensors were
used: one in the tap chamber,
four in the equipment room,
three in the tunnel, and three
at the tunnel portal. The tunnel
portal sensors served as
controls for comparative analysis.
When the sensors were in
place and the plugs restored
and sealed, the connecting
cables were run back to the
entrance shaft.
The next step involved getting
the cables up through the basement
floor of the warehouse
and connected to the recording
station. This required pounding
a hole through 16 inches of
reinforced concrete with a star
drill and hammer! It took three
days before the cables were connected
and operating.
The first readings showed that
the temperatures in the ground
above the tunnel were in general
agreement with the
readings from the sensors at
the tunnel portal; however,
temperatures in the ground
over the equipment room were
indeed elevated. Later, data
sent to CIA headquarters
showed that the temperatures
over the equipment room were
dropping, almost certainly due
to the supplemental cooling
system.
Further monitoring of ground
temperatures became irrelevant
when the tunnel was discovered
in late April 1956. A team of
East German telephone workmen
unearthed the tunnel while
inspecting the cable system.
That spring had been unusually
wet and we had overheard
numerous conversations about
flooded cable vaults and the
need to fix the problems and
restore communications.
Reflection
Over the years, the Berlin Tunnel
project has been heatedly
debated. Opinions have ranged
widely—some favorable, some
resentful of its success, some
political, and many just plain
wrong. Most of the controversy
has centered on differing interpretations
of net intelligence
value of this costly, time-consuming,
and technically
challenging project. The simple
truth, however, is that Leslie
M. Gross and his Army Crops of
Engineers staff, along with the
British sappers, built the tunnel
and tap chamber in
SECRET!!
Hand salute, gentlemen, hand
salute.
❖ ❖ ❖
“ The completion of this
demanding project is a
tribute to the
resourcefulness and
expertise of an
outstanding team of
”
professionals.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 25
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government
endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
Intelligence in the Public Media
The Movie Breach: A Personal Perspective
Brian J. Kelley
“ Nothing has been
debated as
vigorously as the
question of why
Hanssen was able to
elude detection for
”
two decades.
FBI Supervisory Special Agent Robert Philip Hanssen was a reprehensible
traitor. Off and on for more than 20 years, he spied for
the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), the KGB (Soviet state intelligence
service), and the SVR (Russian intelligence service). Hanssen’s
espionage career came to an abrupt end when he was arrested
on 18 February 2001, just after he had placed a tightly wrapped
package containing highly classified intelligence documents into a
dead drop under a footbridge in Foxstone Park in Vienna, Virginia.
Hanssen was certainly one of the most complex and disturbing
spies of our time. An enigmatic loner, Hanssen spent most of his 25
years in the Bureau specializing in Soviet intelligence matters on
assignments in New York and in Washington DC—at FBI headquarters
and as the FBI’s representative to the State Department.
A senior agent once said of Hanssen, “I can’t think of a single
employee who was as disliked as Hanssen.”1 One of the FBI’s foremost
authorities on technical intelligence, Hanssen understood how
technical applications could be brought to bear on the Bureau’s
most challenging operational initiatives. Moreover, Hanssen knew
how to navigate the bureaucratic labyrinths of the FBI, and, as a
certified public accountant, he understood especially well how work
on the Bureau’s most sensitive and high-profile cases were funded.
Arguably the most damaging spy in US history, Hanssen repeatedly
volunteered his services to Moscow’s intelligence services,
cloaking his activities in a fictitious persona (Ramon Garcia) and
adamantly refusing to reveal to his handlers the identity of his genuine
employer. By all accounts, Hanssen was arrogantly confident
in his ability to “play the spy game” according to the rules he created
and employed. He gambled that he could deceive the FBI and
the Russians and avoid being compromised by any US agent that
might have penetrated Moscow’s services.
1 I. C. Smith. Inside: A Top G-Man Exposes Spies, Lies, and Bureaucratic Bungling Inside
the FBI. Nashville, TN: Nelson Current, 2004, 301.
In Watching the Movie Breach
26 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Many vexing questions exist about Hanssen’s
rationale for acting as he did for as long as he did.
But nothing has been debated as vigorously as
the reasons why he was able to elude detection
for two decades. Attempts to confer on Hanssen
the mythological status of a “master spy” (e.g.,
CBS’s made-for-television movie Masterspy: The
Robert Hanssen Story) are not supported by the
facts of the case, and the key question remains:
Why did it take so long for the FBI to catch a
mole that had operated with impunity within its
ranks for such a long period of time?
Breach, a fast-paced movie directed by Billy
Ray, attempts to answer some of these perplexing
questions. The movie covers only the last six
weeks of Hanssen’s two-decade-long espionage
career, opening in the late fall of 2000, when
Hanssen first came under the investigative
microscope. According to David Wise, author of
one of the best of several accounts of Hanssen’s
life and perfidy, a successful joint CIA-FBI initiative
obtained a package containing a portion of an
operational file pertaining to a mole deeply
embedded in the US counterintelligence community.
2 In addition to the file, the package contained
three other exceptional pieces of evidence:
an audio tape containing two brief telephone conversations
between the mole and a KGB interlocutor
in 1986, copies of letters written by the mole
during 1985–88, and two partial fingerprints
lifted from a plastic garbage bag the mole had
used to wrap a delivery to Moscow. Wise wrote
that the purchase price of the package was
$7 million.
It did not take the FBI long to piece together the
shards of evidence and come to a stunning conclusion:
The mole was one of their own special
agents. Equally shocking to the FBI was the realization
that the person its investigators had
firmly believed to be the mole, a senior CIA counterintelligence
specialist who had been the object
of an extraordinarily invasive counterespionage
investigation over the previous five years, was
innocent. Despite the absence of evidence, the
FBI had convinced CIA officials that it had good
reason to believe that one of CIA’s officers had
been responsible for compromising more than 50
compartmented FBI operations against the Soviet
and Russian intelligence services operating in the
United States during the period 1985–2000.3
During those five years, the FBI invested a
staggering amount of technical and human
resources to try to obtain evidence to corroborate
its suspicions against that officer. He was placed
under 24-hour surveillance, his home and work
spaces were covertly searched, and computers
and telephones in both his home and office were
put under technical surveillance. Even an elaborate
“false flag” operation was run against him—
it proved no guilt; the officer dutifully reported
the unsolicited contact. On top of that, the officer
was subjected to a ruse polygraph administered
by a senior FBI polygrapher.
The results of all these efforts revealed nothing
pointing to the officer’s guilt. Moreover, the
senior FBI agent who administered the polygraph
was adamant that the examination determined
without a doubt that the alleged CIA spy
registered a “no deception indicated” response.
With nothing to substantiate contentions that the
CIA officer was a “master spy” who somehow
managed numerous acts of treason without leaving
behind any clues and who always stayed a
step ahead of their efforts, frustrated FBI counterespionage
investigators took to calling the officer
the “Evil Genius.”
The information contained in the acquired package,
while damning to Hanssen, was only enough
to support charging Hanssen with relatively
minor offenses, and the FBI wanted to build an
2 David Wise. SPY: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert
Hanssen Betrayed America. New York: Random House, 2003.
Reviewed in Hayden Peake, “The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf,”
Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2003)
3 Many of the details of this case were published in the unclassified
US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General
report, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting,
and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen,
August 2003. Fuller accounts were published in Secret and
Top Secret versions.
In Watching the Movie Breach
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 27
ironclad case that would lead to the death penalty.
To do this, Hanssen had to be caught in flagrante
in an operational activity involving his
Russian intelligence handlers. Time was of the
essence, as Hanssen was facing mandatory retirement
in less than six months.
To buy time, the FBI concocted a plan to lure
Hanssen back to FBI headquarters from his position
at the State Department. Knowing Hanssen’s
frustration with and professional disdain for
the FBI’s antiquated computer systems, the FBI
created a bureaucratic entity called the “Information
Assurance Division,” complete with a wellappointed
office, and offered him a promotion to
the senior executive service. The FBI also offered
to waive Hanssen’s mandatory retirement if he
agreed to take the apparently prestigious position.
Hanssen agreed to the challenge and was
told that the FBI had already selected a young
FBI surveillance specialist, Eric O’Neill, to be his
first employee. What Hanssen did not know was
that O’Neill had been assigned to report on Hanssen’s
activities inside their office.
Breach compellingly portrays much of the
above. As the movie opens, O’Neill, played by
Ryan Phillippe, is summoned to FBI Headquarters
and informed that he is being reassigned
from surveillance duty to an office job in the
Hoover Building. Senior FBI officials inform
O’Neill that he will work for a Special Agent
named Robert Hanssen to monitor his questionable
sexually “deviant” behavior, which O’Neill is
told “could be a huge embarrassment to the
Bureau.”4
On his first day of duty, O’Neill greets a scowling
Hanssen, portrayed exceptionally by Chris
Cooper, who immediately establishes his authority
by telling O’Neill that he can call him either
“sir” or “boss.” Hanssen dismissively refers to
O’Neill as a “clerk,” a derisive label that has had
a long history in the historically caste conscious
FBI.
Although initially disdainful of the young support
assistant, Hanssen soon begins to reach out
to O’Neill because of their common interests in
technology, computers, and Catholicism. Taking
O’Neill under his wing, Hanssen squires the
young officer on a tour of some of the FBI’s working
areas. They pass a vault with a sign reading
“Restricted Access Area: Special Compartmented
Information Facility” (SCIF) and as they move
down the corridor have the following conversation:
Hanssen: You know what is going on behind
those doors?
O’Neill: No, sir.
Hanssen: There are analysts looking for a spy
inside the Intelligence Community. Highest
clearances but there are no CIA officers in there.
You know why?
O’Neill: No, sir.
Hanssen: Because it is a CIA officer we’re trying
to build a case against. Now, could the mole
be someone from the Bureau and not CIA? Of
course. But are we actively pursuing that possibility?
Of course not. Because we are the Bureau
and the Bureau knows all.
As the innocent CIA officer alluded to in that
dialogue, I felt chills through my body when I saw
that scene, and it triggered immediate flashbacks
to that two-year period in my life, when the
FBI intimated to me, my family, and friends that
I would be arrested and charged with a capital
crime I had not committed.
The scene and the dialogue in Breach were fictional,
but official retrospectives on the Hanssen
case suggest that the scene was a completely apt
characterization of the perspective of the FBI
team investigating the case. (See passage from
the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General report on the next page.)
4 In the commentary on the film that accompanies its CD release,
O’Neill says that in reality he was told that Hanssen was the subject
of a counterintelligence investigation, but he was not told of
the acquisition of evidence against him.
In Watching the Movie Breach
28 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
In this brief segment,
director Billy
Ray perfectly captured
the arrogant,
snarling Hanssen
flaunting his “I’ve got
a secret” attitude that
he inflicted on those
he felt were below his
intellectual station in
life. As I was later to
learn from many who
worked with him,
Hanssen’s frequent
sarcastic comments
were often laced with veiled references showing
utter disdain for what he believed to be the FBI’s
hopeless ineptitude in the field of counterintelligence.
What the scene also revealed was that even
though he was assigned to a backwater position
in 1995, Hanssen knew details of the highly compartmented
hunt for the alleged CIA mole. The
FBI later determined that, starting in the spring
of 1999, Hanssen had made thousands of unauthorized
probes into the FBI’s investigative
records system called the Automated Case Support
System (ACS) and was preparing to reenter
the spy world he had abruptly left in December
1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.5 To
ensure that the FBI was not tracking him, he had
taken to querying the databases for his name and
home address. In one of his forays into the ACS
he stumbled onto what should have been highly
compartmented reporting detailing the FBI’s
intensive investigation of me. His later inquiries
at FBI headquarters yielded my name as the subject
of the investigation.
I first met Hanssen in the early 1980s, when we
worked together on some sensitive counterintelligence
matters of common interest to the FBI and
CIA. We once lived on the same street and took
official trips together. He once visited my office at
CIA, when he was
negotiating the placement
on my staff of
one of his senior analysts.
I was told he
was shocked to learn
that the FBI believed I
was a master spy.
Ironically, he downloaded
relevant investigative
reports on me
from the ACS and
included them as part
of his initial communication
with the SVR
when he alerted them that “Ramon Garcia” was
back in the game.6 For more than a year and a
half, Hanssen passed copies of the FBI’s investigative
reports on me to the SVR via his customary
dead drops. (He would later claim that he was
trying to “save” me.)
People who have lived events that are about to be
portrayed in films have every reason to worry
about what the films will contain. I was no different.
Some months before the film was finished, a
contact in Hollywood sent me a copy of the original
screen play. I felt it was appallingly poorly
written, and in my mind, the movie had the makings
of a disaster as bad as the much ballyhooed
The Good Shepherd, which promised much but
delivered little.7 With some trepidation, I attended
a pre-launch showing of Breach as the guest of a
media acquaintance. I fully expected the movie to
sacrifice reality to a skewed Tinsel Town vision of
real life. To my great surprise, 20 minutes into the
movie, I realized I was very wrong.
After the showing, I was introduced to Director
Ray, who was interested in my opinion of his production.
He was pleased to hear my positive
response. After I remarked on the SCIF scene, he
told me he knew the basic outline of my story but
could write no more about me than was con-
5 US Department of Justice, Commission for Review of FBI Security
Programs (Webster Commission), A Review of FBI Security
Programs, 31 Mar 2002.
6 USDOJ, IG Report, 15.
7 See David Robarge et al., “Intelligence in Recent Public Media,
The Good Shepherd,” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 1 (2007).
The FBI should have seriously questioned its conclusion
that the CIA suspect was a KGB spy and
considered opening different lines of investigation.
The squad responsible for the case, however, was so
committed to the belief that the CIA suspect was a
mole that it lost a measure of objectivity and failed to
give adequate consideration to other possibilities. In
addition, while FBI management pressed for the
investigation to be completed, it did not question the
factual premises underlying it. Similarly, the CIA's
SIU did not serve as an effective counterbalance to
the FBI, because it was not an equal partner in the
molehunt.
—DOJ IG Report, 2003.
In Watching the Movie Breach
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 29
tained in the scene: “I could only make a passing
reference to your case due to time and story line
restrictions. What happened to you was so powerful
that it would have overwhelmed the story if I
tried to bring your case into the film any more
than I did.” I told Ray that I fully understood and
completely agreed.
He asked me if there were any noticeable mistakes
in the movie. I laughed and told him the
first mistake I saw was when the movie opened
with a clip of the press conference at which Attorney
General John Ashcroft announced Hanssen’s
arrest. I pointed out that the crawler used to
show the date of the press conference was off by a
day. Ray looked crestfallen and told me he realized
the mistake just hours before final production
and said it had been too late to make a
correction. He said he would ensure the correct
date was used on the DVD version—and he did.
I also mentioned scenes in the movie involving
Hanssen’s sexual behavior. The movie suggested
that some of his activities were discovered before
his arrest, but in reality investigators did not
learn of them until after Hanssen’s arrest. These
included Hanssen’s bizarre one-year relationship
with an “exotic dancer,” his clandestine filming of
his love-making with his unsuspecting wife, and,
finally, his posting on the Internet of soft porn
stories in his true name. Ray acknowledged that
the information came after Hanssen’s arrest, but
in this case he claimed literary license to make
sure he captured this aspect of the man.
Later, Ray and I were to have several discussions
and E-mail exchanges about scenes that
struck me as particularly compelling. One such
scene involved dialogue in which O’Neill’s supervisor
unburdened herself to him, saying:
A task force was formed to find out who was
giving them [KGB officers who had been
recruited by the FBI] up. We had our best analysts
pouring over data for years trying to find
the mole but we could never quite identify him.
Guess who we put in charge of the task force?
He was smarter than all of us.
I can live with that part, but the idea that my
entire career had been a waste of time is the part I
hate. Everything I’ve done since I got to this office,
everything we were paid to do, he was undoing it.
We all could have just stayed home.
That commentary sums up the feelings of intelligence
officials who must come to grips with the
knowledge that someone very close to them has
become a traitor. Colleagues who worked with
traitors such as Rick Ames, Jim Nicholson, Earl
Pitts, and Ana Montes all had the same sick feeling
upon learning that someone they trusted had
breached their trust.
In a closing scene, Hanssen has a discussion
with a senior FBI official as he is being transported
to jail after his arrest:
Can you imagine sitting in a room with a bunch
of your colleagues, everyone trying to guess the
identity of a mole and all the while it is you
they’re after. It must be very satisfying, don’t
you think?
The scene was fiction, but it, too, was very
believable and haunting. No one should feel sorry
for the likes of Hanssen, who caused the deaths of
several Soviet intelligence officers. We must be
reminded of two comments in Hanssen’s sentencing
memorandum:
Even though Aldrich Ames compromised each of
them [executed Soviet Intelligence officers], and
thus shares responsibility for their executions,
this in no way mitigates or diminishes the magnitude
of Hanssen’s crimes. Their blood is on his
hands.…That we did not lose the Cold War ought
blind no one to the fact that Robert Philip Hanssen,
for his own selfish and corrupt reasons,
placed every American citizen in harm’s way.8
Breach is not a perfect movie but it hammers
home how precious our freedoms are and how
vulnerable we are to potential traitors within.
8 www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen_senmemo.pdf, 10 May 2002.
❖ ❖ ❖

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 31
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
Current
Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps, Richard A. Posner
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, Hans Born and Marina Caparini
(eds.)
Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2nd edition revised, Robert M. Clark
The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies, Athan Theoharis
Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C.
Boraz (eds.)
Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11, Amy B. Zegart,
General Intelligence
Detecting Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception Across Time, Cultures, and Disciplines—Supplement
to the Second Edition, Barton Whaley
Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook, J. Ransom Clark
Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies—An Anthology, Second Edition, Loch K.
Johnson and James J. Wirtz
Historical
Comrade J: The Untold Story of Russia’s Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War, Pete Earley
The FBI: A History, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
Intelligence, Statecraft and International Power, Eunan O’Halpin, Robert Armstrong and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.)
Living With the Enigma Secret: Marian Rejewski 1905-1980, Jan Stanislaw Ciechanowski (eds.)
Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremburg: Controversies Regarding the Role
of the Office of Strategic Services, Michael Salter
Intelligence Services Abroad
Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss, K. Sankaran Nair
Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, B. Raman
The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane, B. Raman
The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists, Michael Ross
with Jonathan Kay
Correction: The review of Enemies: How America’s Foes Steal our Vital Secrets (Bill Gertz) in the “Intelligence
Officer’s Bookshelf” of Studies Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007) may have led readers to infer that Gertz lifted
material about Ana Montes from Scott Carmichael’s biography of the Cuban agent, True Believer. Carmichael’s
book, also reviewed in the issue, appeared after Enemies, and the review meant only to point out
that Enemies included unattributed material on Montes that True Believer would confirm.

Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 33
Current
Richard A. Posner, Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007).
Journalists and academics with no direct experience in the intelligence
profession often do not let their lack of knowledge of the subject stand in
the way of making critical analyses of the profession’s performance. Richard
Posner acknowledges that though criticism of the intelligence business
by a federal judge might seem presumptuous, but “an outsider’s
perspective can be valuable.” He is right, of course, and in Countering Terrorism,
his third book addressing intelligence reform, he argues provocatively
that “Kulturkampf [culture conflict]…is the biggest impediment to
improving domestic intelligence, dominated by the FBI despite the bureau’s
permeation by a culture of criminal investigations that is incompatible
with the effective conduct of national security intelligence.” (xii) In
short, he recommends that a separate MI5-like organization be formed to
meet “the growing danger of homegrown terrorism.” The FBI is not suited
to the task, he suggests: “Criminal law enforcement…has shown that it
has only a limited value against terrorism.” The role of the FBI, with its
arrest powers, should be similar to that of the British Special Branch.(xii)
Posner questions the view that because we are at war “we simply don’t
have time to establish a new national security agency.”(12) Precedent, he
argues, suggests otherwise. The creation of OSS, NSA, the National Counterterrorist
Center, Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence during periods of conflict makes his
point.
The balance of the book discusses the organizational, managerial and
leadership problems that would have to be overcome to achieve his goal.
He presents a series of benchmarks in the form of questions that have to
be answered before a decision is made; e.g., is the proposed change an improvement
over what currently exists? His answer is yes because “we are
overinvested in criminal law as a weapon against terrorism. Excessive legalism
in the form of what I call warrant fetishism is also preventing us
from dealing imaginatively with privacy and civil liberties concerns that
domestic electronic surveillance arouses.” Judge Posner concludes by providing
answers to his benchmark questions. His judgment is that the FBI
and DHS do not “understand that intelligence is an alternative, as well as
an adjunct, to law enforcement and military force” and that “congressional
oversight of the reorganized system” is not adequate. In sum, Posner is
convinced that creating a new MI5-like organization with only a security
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article
should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements
and interpretations.
Bookshelf—March 2008
34 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
and counterintelligence mission is necessary to achieve effective domestic
counterterrorism efforts. One aspect not considered is the level of personal
and organizational disruption that creating another new intelligence organization
would entail and the time required for it to become proficient.
Countering Terrorism is a thoughtful and very detailed explication of
Judge Posner’s position; it is worth very serious consideration.
Hans Born and Marina Caparini (eds.), Democratic Control of Intelligence
Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2007), 303 pp., footnotes, bibliography, index.
Cicero, the Roman lawyer and orator, wrote “In time of war, the laws fall
silent.”1Editors Born and Caparini have recast this view in modern terms,
asking: “whether protecting the security of the state should trump all other
objectives and values in society…and preclude any constraints on it?”
(4) Nine of the 15 articles in the Democratic Control of Intelligence Services
examine the issue from the viewpoints of four Western countries (the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Norway) and five from
the former Soviet bloc (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary).2 Six articles discuss the fundamental principles of oversight—
the law, accountability, freedom of information, data protection—
and the need for intelligence. With regard to oversight, which is defined
broadly as “management,” they stress the importance of internal controls
by inspectors general, as well as those applied by the executive and congressional
or parliamentary committees.
The chapters on the former Soviet bloc countries are particularly interesting.
They discuss the degrees of progress made since independence, emphasizing
the extent to which the principles above have been achieved in
each nation and what remains to be done on domestic security and foreign
intelligence reforms. The chapters on the Western countries review the
procedures and institutions in place to assure democratic control of intelligence
and the problems that led to their creation. With the exception of
France, each country formed parliamentary oversight committees after
questionable conduct by one of its intelligence agencies. In France, while
the need for such oversight is recognized, the National Assembly has not
endorsed the formation of an oversight commission.
1 Quoted in James M. Olson, Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying (Washington, DC: Potomac Books,
2006), 18.
2 For analysis of the oversight problem in Canada, South Africa, South Korea, and Iraq, see Hans Born, Loch
K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 35
The final chapter reviews the common problems of implementing effective
democratic and parliamentary oversight of intelligence, the need for international
cooperation, and the lessons learned from the accounts presented.
It concludes with proposals for strengthening oversight while
maintaining a balance between secrecy and transparency.
While the Democratic Control of Intelligence Services looks closely at what
has been and what needs to be done, it does not address the practical problem
of the qualifications of those doing the oversight. Nevertheless, it is a
valuable book that demonstrates the difficulty of acquiring needed intelligence
while protecting basic human rights.
Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2nd
edition revised (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 321 pp., end of chapter
notes, appendix, charts, index.
Joseph Stalin rejected intelligence analysis: “Don’t tell me what you think,
give me the facts and the source!”3 CIA analyst Sherman Kent countered:
“There is no substitute for the intellectually competent human…, who
through firsthand knowledge and study” recommends what facts should
be presented to the decisionmaker.4 Kent went on to say his criterion applied
to collectors and analysts. Dr. Robert Clark, a former CIA analyst,
takes the next step with his target-centric approach—a collaborative analytical
network for successful analysis involving contributions from all
“stakeholders” associated with the target issue. His approach begins with
an explanation of a model that describes what is known and not known
about the target’s functions or behavior. The concept of a model is illustrated
using a WW II operation made famous in Ewen Montagu’s The Man
Who Never Was.5 In that case. the Germans, convinced of the veracity of
inaccurate data deceptively supplied by British intelligence about the invasion
of Sicily, altered their troop dispositions. For the operation to have
worked, MI5 planners had to model how the Germans thought and operated
and the most likely conditions that would lead to the desired German
responses. (5).
The second part of the book discusses methods for creating a model—some
quite complex, though well illustrated. It also examines sources of data,
the techniques of data evaluation, the risks of deception, and the importance
of validation. The third part includes six chapters on predictive analysis
and cover techniques, organizational issues, and technological
aspects. The final chapter deals with the qualities that analysts and customers
must have to increase the likelihood of understanding, if not agree-
3 Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1963), 10.
4 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1966), xxi.
5 Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (Staplehurst, Kent, UK: Spellmount Limited, 2003).
Bookshelf—March 2008
36 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
ment. This is a matter of speaking truth to power when the superiors with
whom analysts must work think of themselves as analysts of at least equal
ability. The two appendices illustrate the importance of differences in analytical
approach in two National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs): one from
1990 on the future of Yugoslavia, the other from October 2002 on WMD in
Iraq that was based on inadequate treatment of multidisciplinary factors
and poorly validated evidence.
Intelligence Analysis is a fine treatment of contemporary analytic tradecraft
that makes clear why the analyst has one of the toughest jobs in the
profession.
Athan Theoharis, The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations
Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 320 pp.,
index.
Marquette history professor Athan Theoharis introduces his new book by
agreeing with the 9/11 Commission that CIA and FBI failures to cooperate,
share information, and analyze intelligence properly were among the
factors that contributed to the disaster. But he strongly opposes the corrective
action recommended—“a more centralized bureaucracy, headed by
a DNI.”(4, 267) Theoharis views such an approach as part of the “quest for
absolute security,” a phrase never used by the committee, that would place
undesirable limits on human rights.(4) History, he suggests, does not support
the commission’s conclusion on centralization. On the contrary, he
claims, increased centralization will only lead to more abuses by the intelligence
agencies. The balance of the book attempts to make the point. It
fails.
The Quest for Absolute Security begins with a summary of the national security
background that led to the creation of the FBI. Succeeding chapters
review well-known espionage cases, civil rights policies, congressional investigations,
and bureaucratic rivalries associated with the coming of
WW II, the Cold War, the post–Cold War period, and 9/11. Professor Theoharis
discusses each era’s many failures, violations or abuses attributed to
the Bureau and, to a lesser extent, OSS and CIA. But he presents nothing
to demonstrate that either the successes or mistakes cited actually occurred
in the search for “absolute security,” an objective even the author
admits is unrealistic. Moreover, he offers nothing to suggest that the many
difficulties he recounts resulted from centralized control and are thus likely
to be repeated under a DNI. Poor management, political interference,
frequent mission modifications, fluctuating budgets, and long learning
curves are equally likely explanations for the problems he cites though
none are mentioned. To avoid the problems he foresees under the new centralization,
Professor Theoharis offers a solution: “stricter congressional
oversight.” He will probably see that happen, but not for the reasons he
suggests.
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 37
Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.), Reforming Intelligence:
Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2007), 385 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.
The need for intelligence reform in democratic nations is an unchallenged
assumption of Reforming Intelligence. The editors point out that there are
no studies or benchmark models for determining when the reformers have
got it right. They propose applying a modified version of the familiar “civilmilitary
relations (CMR)” model to civil-intelligence relations as a framework
for analysis and judgment.(2) The need for modification follows because
only two of the three basic elements of CMR—civilian control,
effectiveness and efficiency—can be applied; efficiency cannot be assessed
because of “the essential, fundamental requirement for secrecy” (1, 5) applied
to budgets and related potential performance measures. The 13
chapters of the book are written by a mix of academics and intelligence officers.
They include a review of the processes by which information becomes
intelligence in democratic societies, followed by studies that discuss
democratic control and effectiveness in three Western nations—the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France—and seven “new democracies”—
Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, Romania, South Africa, Russia, and the
Philippines. Three chapters are devoted to the United States. They discuss
oversight—internal, congressional and judicial—and obstacles to reform.
The final chapter compares the “development of controls” and the effectiveness
achieved among the various countries dealing with reform.
The problems discussed are different for each nation as indicated by the
following examples. Oversight in France, as Professor Douglas Porch
points out, is restricted by the persistence of traditional military influence
over its intelligence agencies. Romania, according to Cristiana Matei, has
yet to break free of “the cultural legacy of prior regimes.”(235) Civilian control
in Russia, as described by Mikhail Tsypkin, is complicated by terrorism
and “a KGB/FSB/SVR mindset.”(295) In each case, the general
solution suggested is an informed populace, better oversight, and accountability.
For comparison, former CIA general counsel Elizabeth Rindskopf
Parker and Bryan Pate provide a detailed historical review of oversight in
America that suggests the possible need for permanent judicial review
commissions that “might enhance public confidence.” (68)
Reforming Intelligence does not demonstrate that the CMR model is any
help in solving intelligence reform issues. And its claims that assessing
performance is greatly limited by secrecy are not supported. To its credit,
the book leaves no doubt about the complexity of oversight issues. It is well
documented, well written, and should serve as a foundation for studying
this persistent problem.
Bookshelf—March 2008
38 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 352 pp., endnotes, index.
In her first book, Flawed By Design, UCLA professor Amy Zegart argued
that the CIA “was never supposed to engage in spying,”(163) that “the
agency was given no authority to engage in covert activities of any sort be
it collecting intelligence or conducting subversive political activities
abroad,” (187) and that “CIA failures were an inevitable consequence of
the way [it was] structured” at the outset.(231)6 Citing statutory evidence,
historians promptly noted that the first two propositions were flawed by
inaccuracy.7 But the idea that organizational structure was the principal
determinant of CIA failures could not be disproved and had daunting implications
as a harbinger of failures to come.
Professor Zegart returns to this topic in Spying Blind. She begins by defining
organization as having three components, “cultures, incentives, and
structures…that critically influence what government agencies do and
how well they do it.”(1) Zegart then develops a model for making comparisons
with three performance factors: “the nature of organizations, rational
self interest, and the fragmented federal government.”(Chapter 2) She
then loosely applies the model to the CIA and FBI before 9/11, allowing for
influences by contributing factors such as their failure to adapt to change,
congressional interference, budget cuts, staff reductions, and mission realignment.
In the case of the CIA, Zegart finds that “the agency did not
miss some of the eleven opportunities it had to potentially disrupt the September
11 attacks. They [sic] missed them all.”(119) She treats the FBI
similarly but more gently. It had “twelve known chances to follow leads
that hinted at impending disaster. In each case, FBI officials missed the
lucky break.”(168) How did this happen? Zegart’s answer for both cases is
“organizational weakness” or “organizational factors.” But she does not offer
convincing evidence, e.g., bureaucratic fragmentation or frequent managerial
change, to prove these assertions or to make them more convincing
than explanations rooted in poor decision making by analysts and managers.
The final chapter summarizes her views on the unsettled Intelligence
Community. In the process she introduces topics not dealt with in depth
previously. For example, she calls for “fundamental changes in analysis,”
though she offers no specifics. As to human intelligence capabilities, which
she does discuss briefly in chapter 4, she claims that there has been “little
progress since 9/11…because the agency’s approach to improving human
intelligence has focused primarily on increasing the number of spies rather
than on improving quality or dramatically increasing nontraditional recruitment
models to penetrate terrorist groups.” Here too she offers little
6 Amy Zegart, Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1999).
7 Michael Warner review of Flawed by Design, in Studies in Intelligence 44, no. 2 (2000): 101–103.
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 39
evidence. In short, while she has enumerated some problems facing the Intelligence
Community, their causes and her recommended solutions to
them remain problematical. Few will challenge her basic conclusion that
“organization matters.”(196) That was a given from the outset. But the
“why and how” it matters more than or as much as other competing parameters
is not proved.
At no time does Professor Zegart question the need for intelligence agencies.
Her conclusion is that “The United States’ ability to protect itself
hinges on whether U.S. intelligence agencies built for a different enemy at
a different time can adapt.”(197) Spying Blind is a thought-provoking, detailed
analysis of current problems that takes historical precedent and the
judgments of many distinguished thinkers into account. Whether it is a
correct assessment of cause and effect and the solutions it recommends is
a question that remains unanswered.
General Intelligence
Barton Whaley, Detecting Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception
Across Time, Cultures, and Disciplines—Supplement to the Second Edition
(Washington, DC: Foreign Denial and Deception Committee, National
Intelligence Council, 2007), 182 pp., appendix, CD, no index.
This supplement to the 2,444 entries in the second edition of Whaley’s Detecting
Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception adds 253 new items
and revises 49 others. Several of the new entries in the supplement are
themselves bibliographies, and they contain 4,000 more titles on various
topics, for example, counterfeit coins and paper currency, mimicry, true
names of authors of anonymously written works, and myth and fraud in
archeology. Several entries discuss instances in which previous claims
about fakes and forgeries were incorrect. Whaley notes in the introduction
that while many titles are seemingly redundant, his annotations identify
the “more accurate and detailed pieces that contribute fresh data, new
methods, or original theories.” He adds that the noticeable variance in formats
of the entries is intentional in order to avoid the loss of data that
might occur if a standard format were introduced. Other entry features include
a five-star rating system and keywords that indicate the “styles of
logical detection” in the item. For example, the word medicine indicates an
analogy with medical practice; the word fiction indicates an entry in which
a fictional story is used to make a point. A searchable CD of the Supplement
is included at the back. This is another valuable contribution from
the pre-eminent bibliographer in the field.
Bookshelf—March 2008
40 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
J. Ransom Clark, Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 192 pp., end of
chapter notes, bibliography, appendices, glossary, chronology, index.
Former CIA officer Ransom Clark has written a book with the intention of
providing “those who are interested in watching or even participating in
the intelligence business enough background and context to assist in making
reasoned evaluations of on-going and future activities.”(vii) Intelligence
and National Security does just that. It is a primer that discusses
the definition of intelligence; its historical evolution since the Revolutionary
War; how it is collected, analyzed, and disseminated; the security and
counterintelligence aspects of the process; and the role of covert action. Examples
and brief case studies are included on each topic. The final chapter,
“Where Do We Go From Here,” addresses accountability, the role of Congress,
and the impact of recent reforms. Clark concludes by noting that
“structural and substantive changes are two different matters. New boxes
on organizational charts do not generate new intelligence or change mindsets
in evaluating data. New layers of bureaucracy do not speed up the
flow of information.” Improvements in these areas require good people.
Clark has provided a sound basis for assessing the controversies surrounding
intelligence today. It is a valuable contribution that should be
very helpful to those studying or anticipating a future in the profession.
Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Intelligence and National Security:
The Secret World of Spies—An Anthology, Second Edition (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 553 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography,
index.
Second editions can result from demand pressures, changes in subject
matter detail, and/or the availability of new material. This anthology responds
in part to the latter two criteria. It has changed its name;8 added
two articles, increasing the number to 38; and deleted some earlier contributions
while adding new ones on satellite surveillance, warrantless wiretaps,
and events since 9/11. The other nine parts address definitions—still
no consensus here—the functions described in the so-called intelligence
cycle as applied by selected intelligence community organizations, plus politicization,
counterintelligence, accountability, oversight, and covert action.
The new article on “warrantless wiretaps” deserves attention
although it has little to do with wiretapping, and everything to do with
electronic intercepts. But it does present a variety of viewpoints, including
those of Alan Dershowitz.
Two areas were neglected in the new edition. The first is the index, which
does not include the additions. The second is articles in need of updating.
For example, the article on open source intelligence makes no mention of
8 The previous edition was Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury
Publishing Co., 2004)
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 41
the new Open Source Center created under the DNI, but it does state that
the DNI “has chosen to remain focused on secrets for the president,” whatever
that means. More generally, this article does not reflect a grasp of the
current or past approach to open source information. Another example is
the article on counterintelligence, which still has a correctable definitional
problem. Executive Order 12333 has defined counterintelligence and security
as distinct functions, but the description given in this volume subordinates
security to CI.
This anthology is not a collection of the “right” answers to persistent and
often controversial intelligence issues. But it does lay the foundation for
sensible discussion, and that argues strongly for reading it closely.
Historical
Pete Earley, Comrade J: The Untold Story of Russia’s Master Spy in America
After the End of the Cold War (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2008), 340
pp.
Sergei Turanov, Comrade Jean, and Comrade J were among the codenames
used by Sergei Tretyakov, a KGB and SVR intelligence officer until
he defected to the United States in October 2000 with his wife and daughter.
KGB defections were not uncommon during the Cold War, although
they dropped sharply as their utility diminished after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The new Russian government abolished the KGB and established
a separate foreign intelligence service now designated the SVR. Sergei
Tretyakov is the first member of this service to defect to the United
States. He sought out Pete Earley to tell his story because Earley had written
two fine books about American traitors, John Walker who was a KGB
agent, and Aldrich Ames, who spied for the KGB and the SVR.
In Comrade J, we learn that Tretyakov’s childhood goal was to be a KGB
officer like his father. To this end, he learned French and English, graduated
from the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages, where he was spotted
by the KGB. Formally recruited after graduation, he joined the CPSU
and attended the Red Banner Institute, where he learned the tradecraft of
his chosen profession. After a boring assignment in Moscow, where hard
work and additional duties for the party earned him good marks, he was
sent to Canada. Inspired by the Gorbachev reforms, he succeeded in recruiting
several important agents and gained the attention of the right
people at KGB headquarters. After the coup of 1991, his dissatisfaction increased
and in Canada he and his wife considered not returning to Russia,
an option they at first rejected because of the impact the move would have
on family members at home. After a year back in Moscow during which he
watched as several of his colleagues were arrested and executed as CIA
agents (thanks to Ames), Tretyakov was assigned to the New York Residency
in April 1995. He never returned to Russia.
Bookshelf—March 2008
42 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
For the traditional reasons of security, the details of his defection are not
revealed in Comrade J. Earley does describe some of Tretyakov’s operations
in Canada and America with emphasis on sources developed and
agents recruited, some of whom he names. In the category of “special unofficial
contact,” he mentions former US deputy secretary of state Strobe
Talbot, stressing that Talbot was not an agent and implying that the SVR
did not realize that their contacts with him were routine, not secret communications.
Tretyakov also reported on the SVR penetrations of the United
Nations and the operations and personnel of the SVR residencies to
which he was assigned. Tretyakov’s descriptions of bureaucratic infighting
and his functions as deputy resident and later as acting resident suggest
that in some respects the profession has changed little from KGB
days.
Of particular interest from the US point of view, the book reveals that for
three years before his defection in October 2000 Tretyakov worked for the
FBI, providing details of residency operations and personnel. Ten months
before his defection, the FBI encouraged him to leave but could not tell
him the reason: it was hunting a mole who might learn about him. When
Tretyakov’s defection became public on 30 January 2001 and Robert Hanssen
was arrested on 18 February 2001, the press presumed Tretyakov was
the one who gave him up. The FBI assured Earley that this was not the
case.
Finally, as with all unsourced defector memoirs, one must deal with the
question of accuracy. In this case, the narrative contains two technical errors
worth noting: (1) reference to Tretyakov as a double agent is incorrect,
and (2) the statement that the CIA calls its employees “agents” is
wrong.(48) Recognizing that independent assessment of Tretyakov’s story
is desirable, Earley includes a chapter with comments from “a high-ranking
US intelligence official” that addresses the kinds of material Tretyakov
provided and affirms that it included names and “saved American
lives.” Further detail is attributed to other “intelligence sources,” as, for
example, the fact that the bug planted in the State Department conference
room in the late 1990s had a “miniature battery…recharged with a laser
beam.”(323) If correct, someone would have had to have line-of-sight access
to the battery, but no comment is made on this point.
In the end, although Earley has provided another well told espionage case
study, he leaves the curious hoping for a second volume containing more
details of Tretyakov’s work for US intelligence.
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2007), 317 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.
Herodotus, Cicero’s pater historiae, is said by modern historians to have
been generally “fair-minded and balanced…if not always entirely accurate,”
even though there is not a source note in Herodotus’s book, The HisBookshelf—
March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 43
tories.9 The FBI: A History has source notes and still meets these criteria,
with one significant revisionist exception. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, a professor
of American history at Edinburgh University, begins by noting the
“richness as a source” of the FBI case files and then writes, “I have tried
to produce a work from the standpoint that is liberated from the bureau’s
filing system…in the context of broader historical currents.” The currents
he chooses are racism and civil liberties.(vii) And to show that both have
long been driving factors in Bureau history, Professor Jeffreys-Jones
changes the date the FBI was formed as the Bureau of Investigation, from
1908 to 1871!(3) This liberty is justified, he tells readers, because the Bureau
“has long been…an unjust organization,” where “prejudice ran deeper
than the nation at large.” The first two chapters of the book use this
historical sleight of hand to discuss “Bureau history” over a period of nearly
38 years before it was formed.
The remaining chapters of The FBI present a balanced review of the FBI’s
organization and functions from its creation in 1908 to the present. Its scope
is broader than that of Raymond Batvinis’s The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence,
which focused on counterintelligence until mid–WW II.10 But it is
topically similar to Athan Theoharis’s The Quest for Absolute Security (see
above): bureaucratic battles, espionage, security, political surveillance, communist
threat, Cold War, post–Cold War change, and possible 9/11 reforms.
One exceptional topic is race relations, which Jeffreys-Jones mentions from
time to time, although not nearly as often as his introductory remarks suggest.
For example, both Theoharis and Jeffreys-Jones discuss adjustments
in the FBI counterintelligence mission that President Roosevelt approved in
1939. Theorharis sees the consequences in terms of actions against subversives.
Jeffreys-Jones, on the other hand, suggests that “historians must try
and gauge the significance of the 1939 reform, not just for the FBI, but for
the history of race relations.”(98) In the realm of civil liberties, Jeffreys-
Jones is overly concerned about the impact of a “Gestapo Factor”—fear of
knocks on doors at night and unlawful surveillance—that some in the United
States expressed after WW II.
Jeffreys-Jones devotes considerable attention to investigations from the
Church Committee to the 9/11 Commission and how Hoover’s successors
tried to implement reforms, a task complicated, he suggests, by frequent
unplanned high-level personnel changes in the Intelligence Community.
To be fair, The FBI: A History, also mentions the FBI’s achievements, the
role of Robert Lamphere in the VENONA case being a good example. But
some of the book’s claims are factually incorrect: the FBI did not initiate
the investigation that uncovered Aldrich Ames; it joined in after the CIA
had done so.(223) With respect to the Robert Hanssen case, Hanssen was
not arrested at “a dead-drop site in Tysons Corner”; Vienna, Virginia, de-
9 Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007), 728.
10 Raymond Batvinis, Origins of FBI Counterintelligence, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. Reviewed
in “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf,” Studies in Intelligence 51, No. 3 (2007).
Bookshelf—March 2008
44 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
serves that honor. Likewise, Hanssen did not ask, “What took you so
long?” when captured.(226) Finally, the Wen Ho Lee case was not a product
of racial bias.(224)
Jeffreys-Jones is not optimistic about the FBI’s future. The organization,
he asserts, has “always been a showcase for human frailties and bitter controversies,
and no reformer could reasonably expect to change that.”(253)
What he does not seem to recognize, however, is that operational success
is at least as dependent on professional competency, which even he admits
is high. In short, the Bureau’s track record does not support the professor’s
assessment.
Eunan O’Halpin, Robert Armstrong and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.), Intelligence,
Statecraft and International Power—Irish Conference of History (Dublin:
Irish Academic Press, 2006), 246 pp., end of chapter notes, Index.
In 2005, the Irish Committee of Historical Sciences sponsored a conference
at Trinity College in Dublin on intelligence from ancient to contemporary
times. This volume contains 15 of the papers presented. Three of the authors
are from the United States, one is from Scotland, and the balance
from Ireland. All are academics with solid credentials. Seven articles discuss
the history of Irish intelligence over four centuries, a fascinating topic
little reported in literature. One on Anglo-Scottish relations in medieval
times considers the familiar question: Did intelligence matter? Another
describes intelligence during the last Chinese dynasty, which ended in
1911. Others include intelligence in India at the turn of the 20th century,
in Rome during the reign of Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98–117), Stalin’s use of
intelligence in WW II, British covert action against Egypt after the Suez
crisis of 1956, and the role ambassadors played in intelligence in Renaissance
Italy. The final contribution deals with intelligence during the current
conflict in Iraq.
It should come as no surprise that espionage in ancient times has many
similarities to today’s enterprise, although the penalties for an agent’s
failure are less drastic now. Likewise, as Christopher Andrew notes in his
foreword, speaking truth to power, whether in Soviet times under Stalin,
in Saddam’s Iraq, or during the war on terror, has always been a challenge
for those in intelligence work. The broad historical perspective of this volume
on what works and what does not in intelligence will be of value to
students of the profession as they search for answers to today’s intelligence
problems.
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 45
Jan Stanislaw Ciechanowski (eds.), Living With the Enigma Secret: Marian
Rejewski 1905-1980 (Bydgoszcz, Poland: Bydgoszcz City Council, 2005), footnotes,
photos, chronology, no index. Preface by Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski.
With the publication of The Ultra Secret in 1974, the world learned that
British codebreakers had broken the secret traffic produced by the German
Enigma machine.11 This achievement aided the British victory in the
Battle of the Atlantic, allowed the allies to monitor German military movements,
and made possible the successful Double Cross operation that identified
all German agents in Britain and allowed MI5 to turn many into
double agents. What was not reported then and not formally and officially
recognized until 2005, was that three Polish cryptographers had broken
the code in 1933 and given their results to the British just before WW II.
One of the cryptographers was lost in France before he could get to Britain.
The other two worked with the British throughout the war. One
stayed in Britain after the war, where his contributions went unacknowledged.
The third, Marian Rejewski, returned to his family in Poland where
he hoped to finish his PhD, but the communist government prevented him
from achieving this goal. He died in 1980.
Living With the Enigma Secret is a collection of reminiscences in Rejewski’s
honor. A contribution by Rejewski’s daughter gives biographic details
and reveals that her father wrote and published an article in 1967 about
his breaking the Enigma: no notice was taken. Then, in 1973, French cryptographer
Gustave Bertrand published a book telling of Rejewski’s role. It
too went unnoticed in the West. Other articles in this book describe the
role of the Polish security services prior to WW II, provide details of just
how the Poles contacted the British and made available the Enigma secret,
and reveal Rejewski’s treatment by the Polish communist security
services. French historian, Colonel Frederic Guelton, adds a short piece on
the French participation in the Polish “cracking the Enigma.”(265) The final
article, by David Kahn, explains the value of Enigma in the Battle of
the Atlantic. The book concludes with a detailed chronology of Rejewski’s
life.
Living With the Enigma Secret is an important, long overdue contribution
to the history of cryptology and sets straight the record of Marian Rejewski’s
role.12
Michael Salter, Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution
at Nuremburg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of
11 F.W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper&Row, 1974).
12 For a more detailed discussion of the cooperation between Britain and Poland during WW II see: Tessa
Stirling, Daria Natecz, and Tadeusz Dubicki, Intelligence Co-Operation Between Poland and Great Britain
During World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee (London: Vallentine Mitchell,
2005). Reviewed in “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf,” Studies in Intelligence 50, No. 1.
Bookshelf—March 2008
46 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1
Strategic Services (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 458 pp., footnotes,
bibliography, appendix, index.
At first glance the idea that OSS played a role in the Nuremburg war
crimes trials seems an impossibility since the organization was abolished
before the trials began. But in a sense it is accurate. During the war, OSS
established a war crimes staff that grew to 130 analysts and assembled
data on individuals that might be tried after the war. This staff remained
in Nuremburg after the war as part of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU)
that replaced OSS. Most of this very detailed book dwells on its contribution
and the participants involved. One of its major themes is the controversy
surrounding the granting of immunity to suspected war criminals
who might have been of help to the Allies in the post-war world in which
the Soviet Union was viewed as the next threat. One example looked at in
detail is the case of SS General Karl Wolff, who cooperated with Allen
Dulles in Operation Sunrise, an operation that was intended to bring the
war in Italy to a close before a German surrender. For his efforts, Wolff escaped
trial at Nuremberg, and this book examines “the trenchant moral
judgments regarding Wolff’s alleged immunity from prosecution”(5) in
terms of evidence found since the decision was made.
The book details the involvement in Nuremberg of OSS Director William
Donovan, who during the war planned on an OSS role in any war crimes
trial. After his dismissal in 1945, Donovan was assigned to the Nuremburg
trials as deputy to Robert Jackson, the principal trial judge. Donovan had
definite views on the trials’ handling, and they conflicted sharply with
Jackson’s. For example, Donovan argued that the basis for prosecution of
military war criminals should be documents and direct testimony, an approach
Jackson rejected for the use, inter alia, of films of the concentration
camps. The book mentions that former OSS officer Franz Neumann
helped Donovan in these matters, although Salter does not point out that
Neumann was a Soviet agent.
According to Salter, before the differences with Jackson led to Donovan’s
dismissal, he conducted a series of one-on-one negotiations with Herman
Goering. Salter alleges that Donovan urged Goering to accept responsibility
for all the Nazi war crimes in order to expedite Goering’s sentencing
and execution. The top leaders would be tried at Nuremberg while most
former Nazis would be tried under German law by German courts. The
idea is said to have been unacceptable to Jackson. Unfortunately this story,
while interesting, is not well documented.13
13 The source Salter uses for this story is Richard Dunlop, DONOVAN: America’s Master Spy (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1982). Unfortunately Dunlop does not document this point. Neither Slater nor Dunlop explains
how Donovan, who did not speak German, could have had “one-on-one” conversations with Goering, who did
not speak English.
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 47
Nazi War Crimes is an unexpected and important contribution to OSS history.
It is comprehensive and with the exception noted, thoroughly documented
with primary sources. And it adds a new chapter to the life of the
legendary “Wild Bill” Donovan.
Intelligence Services Abroad
B. Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane (New Delhi: Lancer
Publishers, 2007), 294 pp., index.
———, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers,
2002), 416 pp., bibliography, index.
K. Sankaran Nair, Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered
Moss (New Delhi, Manus Publications, 2008), index.
History has always been important to retired Indian intelligence officer B.
Raman. In Kaoboys of R&AW, citing the CIA “historical division” precedent,
(27) he reveals that in 1983 Rameshwar Nath Kao, the first chief of
India’s foreign intelligence service—the Research & Analysis Wing—established
a historical section. Unfortunately, it was abolished in 1984
when Kao left office. Raman was not surprised; he knew that in India organizational
change often followed new leadership. Raman had joined the
Indian Police Service in 1961 and was transferred in 1967 to the External
Division of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), then India’s foreign intelligence
element. He became a Kaoboy when R&AW was established as an independent
entity in 1968. After assignments in Paris and Geneva, he headed the
Counter-Terrorism Division from 1988 to 1994 and then retired to accept
a cabinet secretariat position, where he served on various antiterrorism
commissions and testified twice before the US Congress. After his permanent
retirement, citing the precedents set by retired CIA officers, he decided
to write these memoirs.
Kaoboys of R&AW tells about India’s struggle to develop a full range of intelligence
service capabilities while at war with Pakistan and China and
while managing conflicts among religious factions and dealing with tribal
disputes on its borders. Raman also examines charges of CIA disinformation
campaigns and covert action operations against India, R&AW efforts
to counter domestic and foreign terrorist acts, and the constant turf battles
with the Indian domestic intelligence service, the IB.
The book has two central themes. The first is the relationship of R&AW to
the prime ministers under which it served, and the problems created when
two of them were assassinated. Those unfamiliar with India get a sense of
its political history. The second theme is the pervasive threat to national
security from Pakistan and separatist groups as well as the actions taken
to deal with provocations and incidents. Raman does not provide operaBookshelf—
March 2008
48 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)
tional detail in terms of tradecraft or case studies. There is a chapter on
R&AW relations with foreign intelligence agencies that concentrates on
high-level contacts with the CIA and French services. An example of the
latter is a visit to the CIA by Kao where he is received positively by DCI
George Bush. He views the relationship with the CIA as a mix of cooperation
when interests coincide and the reality of the operational imperative.
As an example of the latter, he mentions instances in which the CIA recruited
two R&AW officers. He does not mention the reverse possibility.
Kaoboys of R&AW gives a good high-level overview of the formation, evolution,
and current status of the Indian intelligence services.
In his earlier book, Intelligence, Raman presents a survey of Indian intelligence
from colonial times, when the IB was created (he calls it the
“world’s second oldest internal security agency”—the French being the
first) (1)—to the present eight intelligence agencies that form India’s intelligence
community. His approach is topical, covering all elements of
modern intelligence—military, political, technical, collection, analysis, covert
action, counterintelligence, oversight, and management of the intelligence
process. For comparison, he often refers to the experience of US
intelligence agencies and the commissions formed to investigate them. For
example, as a basis for establishing India’s military intelligence element,
he cites in great detail the precedents of DIA’s formation and its evolution.
(31–36) Similarly, the NSA, NRO, NGA and related agencies provide the
rationale for counterparts in India. When discussing the requirement for
good counterintelligence, examples from the UK are cited and the Aldrich
Ames case is analyzed as an exemplar of what should and should not be
done.
In short, Raman’s Intelligence is a text book by an experienced intelligence
officer who certainly understands the fundamental elements of the profession
and provides a framework for successful operations, not only in India,
but in any democratic society.
K. Sankaran Nair’s Inside IB & RAW does not deserve the professional attention
Raman’s books have received. Although the dust jacket claims
Nair served as a head of R&AW, in fact, he held the post for less than 3
months in the 1970s.(174) He spent more time in the IB, and the book has
some interesting stories about his attempts in the 1960s to advise recently
formed African nations about security services. Overall, though, he provides
little beyond anecdotal “scribblings”(95) focusing on personal episodes
and dealings with his superiors that are of no great intelligence
value. It is a memoir covering his entire life, and while it no doubt recounts
some impressive political accomplishments, it is primarily of local interest
and a minor contribution to the intelligence literature.
Bookshelf—March 2008
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008) 49
Michael Ross with Jonathan Kay, The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story
of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists (New York: Skyhorse
Publishing, 2007), 294 pp., no index.
When in 1992, Victor Ostrovsky attempted to publish By Way of Deception,
a book that revealed his adventures as a Mossad officer, the Israeli government
obtained an injunction against the Canadian publisher. The process
was repeated for an American edition. Ostrovsky fought back, and
both editions were eventually published. The publicity made them best
sellers and confirmed his former status. Now, Michael Ross, claiming the
same credentials, has followed a similar path, but with no comment from
Israel.
Volunteer is the story of Canadian Michael Ross, who went to Europe to
see some of the world after completing military service. On impulse he
went to Israel. There he worked on a kibbutz, learned Hebrew, converted
to Judaism, married an Israeli, and was recruited by the Mossad in 1988
where he served until 2001. Ross tells in considerable detail of his training
before describing missions in Africa, Europe, South East Asia, and the
United States. There also were missions in the Middle East against terrorist
groups “to foil attempts by Syria, Libya, and Iran to acquire advanced
weapons technology.”(vii) He describes assignments at Mossad headquarters
and as liaison with the FBI and CIA, in which he has unflattering remarks
to make about the late CIA officer Stan Moskowitz that suggest
Ross did not know him at all.
Life in the field was too much for Ross’s marriage, and he divorced, became
estranged from his children, and suffered “depression, anger, compulsive
behaviors, posttraumatic syndrome, and general alienation.”(viii) But, he
tells the reader, he still admires the Mossad and all it stands for. Ross says
at the outset that much of his book is “nominally secret,” adding, with a
touch of arrogance, that his former colleagues need not worry, as he has
left out anything that in his “judgment” might “compromise” them.(viii)
Volunteers has been published in the United States and in Canada, but the
latter version lacks a chapter titled, Failure To Launch, that tells of Ross’s
work against Hamas with FBI-CIA contacts. No explanation is given. Both
editions lack documentation. We are left with a well written story book
that asks the reader to “trust me,” but provides little reason to do so.
❖ ❖ ❖